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Introduction 
The two decades since the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo 
have seen a continuation of strong population and sustainability trends in some parts of the ECE region 
but stalling in others. Public policies and programs have experienced similar disparities. Taken together, 
the countries of this region constitute a globally relevant laboratory in which much can be learned about 
the relationships between policy and outcomes, and in which emerging issues can be identified along with 
policies and practices that might effectively amplify or constrain their consequences. Indeed, many 
challenges that the ECE region is facing today are expected to become relevant in other parts of the 
world. With this global perspective in mind, this Report discusses recent trends in population and related 
outcomes as well as the policies that may influence these outcomes in the ECE region, always through a 
lens focusing attention on the future.1 
 
The Report is structured into three analytical parts. Part 1 contains a description and analysis of recent 
trends in population and related matters, as well as future population prospects. Part 2 focuses on analysis 
of policy responses to these recent demographic trends and challenges, highlighting concrete examples of 
policy implementation, particularly best practices across the region. We emphasize policies that appear 
most efficient and the conditions under which such policies best operate. Part 3 extends the two previous 
parts with a set of policy recommendations derived from the analysis of best practices and a forecast of 
possible population trends under different policy scenarios. 
 
Our focus throughout is on trends that are seen as most pressing in the ECE region and most likely to 
continue, or that may well emerge over the next 20-40 years. Among these, we emphasize particularly the 
trends that will require special policy attention. Both the trends and the policies will be found to vary 
considerably across the sub-regions and across the countries within them. Because we combine analysis 
of past trends with a view of future developments, we emphasize indicators for which trend data in time 
series are available for most countries in the region. Individual country values are presented in Appendix 
2. Our prospective analysis is based on the 2013 Wittgenstein Centre (WIC) expert argument-based 
population projections by age, sex and education (Lutz et al., 2013), hereafter called the “WIC 
projections.” We use these projections rather than alternatives because their unique design features expert 
argument-based scenarios of future population components by level of education in addition to the usual 
distinctions of age and sex. 
 
Among the wide-ranging aspects of population issues, we distinguish those that are seen as the most 
pressing in the ECE region. We translate those into four “Hot Questions.” We pay particular attention to 
the rationale for each Hot Question, the scientific evidence regarding its relevance, and the policy 
alternatives for addressing it. 
The Hot Questions are:  
1. Is population ageing a threat for the ECE countries?  
                                                           
1The authors acknowledge and appreciate the contributions of Samir KC, Wolfgang Lutz, and Nikola Sander to the 
overall conception of this report and the generation and representation of data. Werner Haug, Marta Diavolova, and 
xx have contributed significantly to the report’s content and clarity. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the 
authors. 
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2. Is migration a threat or opportunity for development? 
3. Is fertility in the ECE region too low? 
4. Are ECE countries becoming less equal societies?  
 
Two cross-cutting themes run through the Hot Questions as well as the whole report, leading to the 
emerging trends and policy emphases formulated explicitly in Part 3. The cross-cutting themes are: 
• Investment in human capital, particularly education and health, is essential. 
Policies and programmes that increase investments in education and human capital more broadly 
expand people’s choices. More productive work in the labour market yields higher incomes for 
individuals and families while supporting aggregate economic growth and expanding the 
possibilities for sustainability. Moreover, knowing about and using family planning expands 
opportunities to fulfil fertility desires. Adaptation to natural disasters is now known to be 
facilitated by a more educated population. Even more broadly, education has a crucial societal 
dimension: it enables the transition to democracy and promotes development of citizens in a 
globalizing society. Good health throughout the life cycle facilitates productivity and participation 
not only in the labour market but also in the family and society. 
• Societies can prosper without growing populations. Continuing population growth is now known 
to be less important to a country’s economic growth than long assumed by macroeconomic models 
and policymakers. In fact, it is human capital, the embodied capabilities and skills of people and 
the duration of their lives in good health and active participation, that matters for economic growth 
and more broadly for national prosperity, rather than the numbers of people. Nations facing 
slowing population growth and even moderate decline need not fear an ageing of population or a 
diminution of national influence, if their human capital development policies are strong and 
effective and their social welfare systems adjust adequately to the demographic changes. 
 
For purposes of the analysis we divide the ECE region into seven sub-regions. This regional division 
distinguishes EU from non-EU countries, which is particularly relevant for the analysis of policies and 
strategies because the EU often provides policy guidelines or frameworks for member states. The regional 
division also respects geographic proximity, with the partial exception of the region comprising Canada, 
the U.S.A. and Israel. Neither geographic nor political alignment places Israel naturally among other 
countries in the region, so we consider it along with two countries at a similar level of development. The 
division of the ECE region into sub-regions is presented in Appendix 3. 
 
Our analysis of past trends and future prospects regarding population size and structure includes both the 
analysis of demographic change (fertility, mortality, migration, and population size and structure by age 
and education) and also social and economic characteristics such as labour force participation, poverty, 
health and reproductive health, and issues of environmental sustainability linked to health. Accordingly, 
we analyse future population trends and the effects of alternative policy regimes on future outcomes by 
comparing the results of three very different policy scenarios at the global level: Continuation of current 
policy trends, Sustainable development policies, and Global fragmentation.2 These describe three 
                                                           
2The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is currently finalizing its Fifth Assessment Report. In this 
context the global modeling community on Integrated Assessment and Vulnerability, Risk and Adaptation has 
agreed to refer to a common set of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) that describe alternative future worlds 
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radically different directions that population and development policies might take in the world. Countries 
of the ECE region take their places in these policy scenarios according to their different levels of 
development and their different positions in the global economy. In turn, these alternative scenarios imply 
three different futures for the size and characteristics of the region’s population, as reflected in the WIC 
projections. We feature these particular scenarios because they enclose the most likely courses relevant 
policies are likely to take, because they place the ECE region consistently within its global policy 
contexts, and because the associated WIC projections for the ECE countries are part of an internally 
consistent set of projections for all countries. In Section 3, these scenarios will illustrate how the policy 
gaps identified in Section 2 may play out if policies continue much as they are, compared with alternative 
regimes of sustainability emphasis, on the optimistic side, or increasing global fragmentation, in the other 
direction. 
In Part 1 we concentrate on the scenario of “Continuation,” in which trends of recent decades persist, with 
some progress towards achieving development goals, reductions in resource and energy intensity at 
historic rates, and slowly decreasing fossil fuel dependency. Some international cooperation and 
investments in technology development and transfer support moderate economic growth in low-income 
countries, with slower economic growth in high-income countries. Technology development proceeds in 
industrialized countries, but is not shared with low-income countries. There is evidence of degradation of 
the environment. This middle-of-the-road scenario corresponds to the medium variant of the new WIC 
population projections. It combines assumptions of medium fertility with medium mortality and medium 
migration for all countries. The population growth projections featured in Part 1 of the Report are derived 
from this scenario.3 
 
Population change results from an interplay of fertility, mortality, and migration, and the observed and 
projected population growth in the individual countries is a result of a different mixture of the three. What 
the region had in common in the last two decades was progressive population ageing, increases in the 
mean age of childbearing, and increasing importance of net migration effects on overall population 
growth or decline. We now focus on these processes that lay behind population change. 
Hot Question 1: Is population ageing a threat for the ECE countries? 
 
Today, the most important process that moulds population dynamics in the ECE region is population 
ageing through low birth rates and the increasing life span of the population. In 2010, the median age of 
the population in the ECE region was 37.7 years, and it is expected to rise to 45.5 by 2050 (See Table 
1.1)4 Population ageing will certainly be the source of important challenges in coming decades, not only 
in the ECE region where it is a prominent issue already but also in most other parts of the World.  
Under this Hot Question we focus on the aspects of population ageing linked to mortality, longevity and 
changes in life expectancy. The aspects of ageing linked to birth rates are developed under the Hot 
Question 2.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
with respect to social and economic mitigation and adaptation challenges. WIC/IIASA staff have contributed 
substantially to this formulation. The three scenarios described in this Report are selected from those developed for 
the IPCC. 
3Full descriptions of the three scenarios can be found in Appendix 1. 
4Median age divides the population into two numerically equal groups, with half of the population being younger 
than this age and half older. 
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Table 1.1 Median population age, 2010-2050 
 2010 2030 2050 
South-Eastern Europe 30.0 36.8 42.2 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 37.7 43.3 45.8 
Central Asia 25.0 31.8 37.5 
New EU States 38.9 46.0 51.1 
EU15 41.5 46.4 49.0 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 40.2 44.8 47.8 
North America and Israel 37.0 40.4 43.0 
Total 37.7 42.5 45.5 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
In order to understand well the current and future challenges of ageing societies, adequate measures of 
ageing must be used. Expectations and fears of the increasing burden of older persons on national welfare 
systems and prosperity have nearly always been based on conventional measures of ageing that link 
characteristics and conditions of persons to their chronological ages (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2010). But 
this can be very misleading since people are not only living longer but also staying healthy longer.  
Life expectancy 
Life expectancy at birth grew by five years on average for men and about three years for women in the 
ECE region between 1990 and 2010. The highest levels were for both sexes in Western Europe with the 
highest male life expectancy of almost 81 years in Switzerland and Iceland, and the highest female life 
expectancy of over 85 years in France, Iceland, and Italy. In all the ECE sub-regions, the life expectancy 
of both sexes grew between 2000 and 2010, but in the 1990s and 2000s the sub-regions of Eastern-Europe 
and Caucasus, and Central Asia went through an actual decrease in life expectancy for both sexes, 
particularly for men (Table 1.2, Figure 1.1 and 1.2). The decrease in life expectancy in Eastern Europe 
was driven mainly by Russia and Ukraine. Current life expectancy levels for women in both Russia and 
Ukraine have after a previous decrease progressed back to the same level as in 1990; men life expectancy 
in these two countries is remain lower now than in 1990 but has been trending upward the last several 
years (Appendix 2, Table 1 for individual countries). Life expectancy is clearly higher among the more 
highly educated than among the lower educated (Appendix 2, Table 1). 
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Table 1.2 Life Expectancy at Birth by sex 1990-2050 
Life Expectancy at Birth, men 1990-2050 
 1990 2000 2010 2030 2050 
South-Eastern Europe 62 68 72 75 79 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 64 60 64 70 75 
Central Asia 63 62 64 70 75 
New EU States 67 69 72 77 82 
EU15 73 75 79 83 88 
Western Europe - Non EU 74 77 80 85 89 
North America and Israel 72 74 76 80 84 
Total 69 71 74 78 83 
Life Expectancy at Birth, women 1990-2050 
 1990 2000 2010 2030 2050 
South-Eastern Europe 67 73 76 80 84 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 74 72 75 79 83 
Central Asia 71 70 72 77 81 
New EU States 75 77 80 84 88 
EU15 80 81 84 88 92 
Western Europe - Non EU 80 82 85 89 93 
North America and Israel 79 80 81 85 89 
Total 77 78 80 84 88 
Source: UNDP (2011) and Ediev et al. (2012) 
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Figure 1.1 Life expectancy at birth (Men) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
Figure 1.2 Life expectancy at birth (Women)  
 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
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Considerable life expectancy increase is expected in the coming decades in all ECE countries, with the 
levels for women reaching well over 90 years and men around 88 years in Western Europe, Israel, and 
Canada by 2050, and reaching close to 90 for women and well above 80 in the New EU States and USA 
(See Appendix 2, Table 1). Thus, the WIC population projections anticipate at least the same pace of life 
expectancy increase in the coming decades as has been observed in the past two decades. In the countries 
with the highest life expectancy today, further gains in life expectancy are expected to be concentrated 
mostly in age groups older than 50, as was the case in recent decades (Luy et al., 2011). In the Eastern 
European and Central Asian countries there is further scope for mortality improvement in the younger 
ages, as well.  
Increasing life expectancy contributes to the increasing proportion of the population aged 65 and older in 
the population. Although in the last two decades the share of persons 65-plus in the ECE countries grew 
relatively slowly at about 2.3 % annually and reached 14.1% in 2010, it is expected to grow much faster 
in the coming decades to reach about 20 % by 2030 and 26 % by 2050 (See Table 1.3). This increase will 
propel growth of the old age dependency ratio (Table 1.4).5 For example, Germany, the country with the 
oldest population in the ECE region (with median population age of 44.3 in 2010), has an old age 
dependency ratio of 34 % in 2011, which is expected to reach 68 % in 2050.6 This looks like an alarming 
number. Indeed, it is unless we take into account not only the chronological ageing but also the actual 
changes in disability-free life expectancy. 
 
Table 1.3 Population ages 65 and above (per cent of total) 1990-2050 
 
 1990 2000 2010 2030 2050 
South-Eastern Europe 4.75 6.46 7.50 12.6 20 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 10.37 12.49 13.10 18.8 24 
Central Asia 4.66 5.00 4.88 9.15 15 
New EU States 11.08 13.47 14.84 21.8 31 
EU15 14.63 16.37 18.10 24.9 31 
Western Europe - Non EU 15.14 15.17 15.82 23.2 29 
North America and Israel 12.31 12.35 13.11 20.0 23 
Total 11.75 13.05 14.06 20.4 26 
Source: UNDP (2011) and Ediev et al. (2012) 
 
  
                                                           
5
 Old age dependency ratio is computed here as number of the population age 65 and more divided by the population 
aged 20 to 64. 
6Source: Ediev et al. (2012). Old age dependency ratio is defined here as a proportion of the population aged 65+ 
over the population aged 20-64 years.  
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Table 1.4 Old-age dependency ratio 65+/20-64, 2011 and 2050. Prospective old-age dependency ratio, 
2011 and 2050 
Old-age dependency ratio 65+/20-64, 2011 and 2050 
 2011 2050 
South-Eastern Europe 14.3 40.69 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 19.5 44.04 
Central Asia   
New EU States 23.4 55.93 
EU15 30.0 59.25 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 26.4 56.67 
North America and Israel 21.9 37.30 
Total 23.9 47.98 
 
Prospective old-age dependency ratio, 2011 and 2050 
 2011 2050 
South-Eastern Europe 12.3 20.36 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 22.9 30.08 
Central Asia   
New EU States 19.9 28.61 
EU15 18.4 25.11 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 14.9 22.57 
North America and Israel   
Total 19.1 26.01 
Note 1: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data. 
Note 2: Prospective old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of people with life expectancies of 15 and 
fewer years, divided by the number of people at least 20 years old in age groups with life expectancies greater than 
15 years 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
 
Health-adjusted life expectancy 
Health-adjusted life expectancy (see Table 1.5), which describes how many years of life are spent in good 
health, is increasing rapidly in most countries in the region, at approximately the same rate as 
unconditional life expectancy (Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Sanderson and Scherbov, 2010). This reflects 
the fact that more and more people now are living healthy lives well above the age of 65. Therefore, they 
can still be economically productive, participate in social life, do not need to be dependent, and are not a 
particular burden to the health care systems. In Germany the healthy life expectancy is 72 years. In other 
Western European countries and in Canada and Israel it is between 72 and 75 years, in the New EU States 
about 67 years, but lower in the eastern part of the ECE region (Data for 2007, source: WHO, Table 1.5 
and Appendix 2, Table 1). Hence, more important than biological ageing is the actual health condition of 
the population (not only of older persons) and the proportion of those who are really in disability and in 
need of assistance and special care.  
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Table 1.5 Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy 2007 (both sexes) 
 2007 
South-Eastern Europe 65.9 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 60.2 
Central Asia 57.5 
New EU States 66.7 
EU15 72.6 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 74.4 
North America and Israel 70.4 
Total 68.0 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data. 
Source:UNDP (2011) 
As life without disability gets longer it is useful to think about ageing not only in terms of chronological 
age but also in relative terms, for example, relative to the expected remaining years of life. If we assume 
that 15 years of remaining life is roughly a threshold when the probability of health impairment is getting 
considerably higher, we can formulate an alternative indicator of old age dependency, the Prospective Old 
Age Dependency Ratio (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2008). Prospective Old Age Dependency Ratio is 
defined as "the number of people with life expectancies of 15 and fewer years, divided by the number of 
people at least 20 years old in age groups with life expectancies greater than 15 years" (Sanderson and 
Scherbov, 2010: 1287). Prospective Old Age Dependency Ratio shows a slower pace of ageing than its 
conventional counterpart, and therefore the picture of ageing looks much less dramatic in all the ECE 
countries than it does with conventional measures (Table 1.4). In Germany, for example, the Prospective 
Old Age Dependency Ratio in 2011 is 22% and the projected the Prospective Old Age Dependency Ratio 
for 2050 is 31%, less than half of the projected value of the conventional OADR (Figures 1.3 and 1.4. For 
individual country values see Appendix 2, Table 1).  
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Figure 1.3 Conventional old-age dependency ratio as projected for 2030 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
 
Figure 1.4 Prospective old-age dependency ratio as projected for 2030 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
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Another relevant concern related to the burden of aging is the share of disabled adults in the total 
population. Following the conventional extrapolation of the current health status of the population we 
should expect considerable absolute as well as relative growth of disability in the population. But 
Sanderson and Scherbov (2010) show that because age- and sex-specific disability rates are changing over 
time, the ratio of disabled adults to non-disabled adults will not change dramatically in the coming 
decades. Further data harmonization across the countries and improved data availability are needed to 
develop internationally comparable measures of disability.  
Not only physical capacities but also maintained cognitive skills are important to longer fitness and 
disability-free independent life in the older ages. Internationally comparable tests of seniors’ cognitive 
capacity allow measurement of differences in cognitive capacity among older persons in different 
countries. These comparisons (Skirbekk et al., 2012) show important international variation among 
seniors' cognitive abilities as well as differences in the age dynamics of these capacities. In the test of 
immediate recall of words from 10 read-out nouns, seniors from the USA and Western European 
countries score the best followed by the Central Europeans and, at further distance, the South Europeans 
(Skirbekk et al., 2012). Higher levels of education have been identified as an important predictor of better 
cognitive skills of elderly individuals, while cognitive training in advanced ages has also shown positive 
results (Ball et al., 2002; Le Carret et al., 2003; Skirbekk et al., 2012). Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated that cognitive performance is increasing in successive cohorts (Flynn, 1987; Sacuiu et al., 
2010; Tuddenham, 1948) under conditions of improving educational attainment, nutrition, mortality and 
economic conditions (Sacuiu et al., 2010).Taken together, this evidence leads to the conclusion that 
"nations that are truly challenged by ageing may be those where the cognitive performance among their 
seniors is poor; not those who have chronologically older age structures" (Skirbekk et al., 2012: 772). 
 
Aging and economic performance 
“Working longer and retiring later is not only a matter of whether older individuals want to remain active 
in the labour market as long as possible, but also depends on employers´ capacities and willingness to 
employ and retain older workers” (van Dalen et al. 2010). A recent study among employers in five 
European countries (Greece, Hungary, The Netherlands, Spain, and United Kingdom) showed that most 
employers associate older workers with more experience but perceive that their cost is higher than the 
productivity gain. This is also reflected in a relatively low proportion of employers that find it desirable 
that workers work until higher ages. Less than 50 per cent of the employers surveyed agreed that it is 
desirable for a worker to work after the age of 60. The exception was the United Kingdom where 60 per 
cent agreed. Less than 10 per cent of the employers in Greece, Hungary and The Netherlands found it 
desirable that workers work over the age of 65; in Spain and the UK the proportion was higher but still 
less than 30% (van Dalen et al., 2010). 
These perceptions of employers are, however, contradicted by some research on the age-wage, age-
productivity relationships. Studies at the aggregate level of firms do not bring clear evidence that older 
workers are less productive and/or more costly (Mahlberg et al., 2013 provides a literature review). Some 
studies show that productivity of older workers remains constant over a range of ages as does the cost of 
their work (Aubert and Crépon, 2006). A mismatch between cost and productivity was also not found in 
the study of Austrian firms (Mahlberg et al., 2013). Some other studies show however that separation of 
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older workers can be profitable for certain firms, especially those in manufacturing and information and 
communication technology (Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2007). 
Pension ages 
Many countries have introduced mechanisms that are increasing normal pension age in reaction to the 
increasing life expectancies. These policy measures are however often unpopular and in some countries 
progress too slowly to adequately reflect the gains in life expectancy (as for example in France and 
Austria).  
As of 2010 only a few ECE countries (USA, Israel, Norway, and Iceland) have set legal retirement age at 
higher than 65. All other ECE countries have legal retirement age of 65 or even lower. In many countries, 
especially in the East ECE region, women are still entitled to earlier retirement than men, despite their 
longer life expectancy (Appendix 2 Table 2). We observe also a mismatch between legally set and de 
facto retirement age. In most of the ECE countries the average effective labour market exit age is actually 
lower for both men and women than the legally set retirement age (See Table 1.6)  
Table 1.6 Average effective labour market exit age, 2000 and 2010 
 
 
Average 
effective 
labour 
market exit 
age 2000 
Men 
Average 
effective 
labour 
market exit 
age 2010 
Men 
Average 
effective 
labour 
market exit 
age 2000 
Women 
Average 
effective 
labour 
market exit 
age 2010 
Women 
South-Eastern Europe … … … … 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus … … … … 
Central Asia … … … … 
New EU States 59.07 62.32 56.94 59.78 
EU15 60.64 62.09 59.97 61.67 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 64.05 64.10 63.35 62.63 
North America and Israel 64.37 64.42 63.01 63.65 
Total 61.97 63.09 60.85 62.27 
Source: Eurostat (2012a), OECD (2012), European Commission White Paper on Pensions (2012b) and national 
reports and surveys. 
 
Smoking, alcohol consumption, and obesity  
 
Health conditions of the population over the whole life cycle determine life expectancy and disability-free 
life expectancy. The health status of populations in the ECE region is quite diverse and depends on 
various factors such as medical standards, access to quality health care and behavioural risk factors such 
as smoking.   
 
Smoking is considered “a major health hazard and one of the most important factors that contribute to 
mortality differences between individuals and populations” (Luy et al., 2011). Smoking has been shown 
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to be positively associated with higher occurrence of several types of tumor, lower fecundity, many 
cardiovascular diseases and other undesirable outcomes. In most countries in the ECE region, smoking is 
more prevalent among men than among women, which is considered a strong contributing factor to the 
life expectancy differentials between men and women. Through various interventions, national 
governments of most of the ECE countries try to reduce smoking prevalence. Over the past twenty years 
the proportion of regular daily smokers decreased in most of the ECE countries but still remains on 
average at about 25% of the population aged 15 and above. The most progress in reducing number of 
regular smokers was in the Western Europe Region where the number declined from 34.5 in 1990 to 19.5 
in 2010 (Table 1.7. Individual countries values are in Appendix 2, Table 3). 
 
Table 1.7 Percentage of regular daily smokers in the population 1990-2010 
 1990 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 34.68 33.15 24.99 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 37.95 33.92 31.48 
Central Asia 14.00 19.37 22.33 
New EU States 30.05 28.66 24.81 
EU15 30.08 29.12 22.76 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 34.54 26.68 19.48 
North America and Israel 34.00 27.00 21.70 
Total 31.62 30.10 25.94 
Source: WHO (2013) 
Although there is clear progress in reducing smoking prevalence in the ECE region, alcohol consumption, 
another important contributor to mortality, has stayed relatively unchanged. In 2010, it was about 9.5 
litres per capita of population aged 15-plus in the ECE region. In the last two decades, alcohol 
consumption increased considerably in some countries, notably in Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, 
and the Czech Republic.  
 
Obesity is another factor known to increase risk of serious diseases, impacting life quality and life 
expectancy both for individuals and in the aggregate. According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO, 2013), a person is considered obese if he or she has a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 30 or more. The 
populations of developed countries are getting more obese over at least the second half of the twentieth 
century, now constituting a serious problem. Almost one quarter of the population in the ECE region was 
obese in 2008 (24.5 %)7, with slightly more obese women than men. The national differences are quite 
high. The lowest level of obesity is in the Central Asian republics with the lowest level in Tajikistan 
(10%), while the highest level is in the USA (32 %). Some countries exhibit a striking difference between 
the level of obesity in men and women. In Turkey about 36 per cent of women are obese, compared with 
23 per cent of men. Armenia and Azerbaijan show even higher differences. (Appendix 2, Table 3, 
regional averages are in Table 1.8). 
 
  
                                                           
7This is an age-standardized estimate. 
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Table 1.8 BMI ≥ 30 (age-standardized estimate) Total, Women and Men 2008 
 Total Women Men 
South-Eastern Europe 27.88 32.55 23.02 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 23.66 28.36 17.50 
Central Asia 18.08 20.59 14.97 
New EU States 22.71 22.26 22.76 
EU15 20.06 18.84 21.12 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 16.93 14.21 19.68 
North America and Israel 30.94 32.18 29.51 
Total 24.46 25.65 22.83 
Source: WHO (2013) 
High blood pressure is a wide-spread problem in the ECE region; about 35% of men and 29% of women 
suffer from high blood pressure.8 The sub-regional differences are marginal although national differences 
exist. However, the age-standardized measures may be of varied reliability.  
 
Environmental health 
 
Good health and quality of life depend on, among other factors, the quality of the environment in which 
the population lives. Access to a clean water source and CO2 emissions per capita are two environmental 
quality indicators. The first reflects quality of life and good health prospects for individuals; the latter 
reflects the ecological footprint society leaves behind, due principally to production and consumption 
methods and patterns. The cumulative impacts of the latter are felt globally and will also affect the 
wellbeing of future generations. 
 
Access to a high-quality water source in satisfactory amounts is almost universal in the ECE region, as it 
was already in 1990.9 Some countries, such as Turkey and Georgia, with non-universal access in 1990 
have subsequently made significant progress towards universal provision of secure water sources. In some 
other countries progress has been slower and requires further attention, as in Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and 
Uzbekistan (see Table 1.9 and Appendix 2, Table 4) 
 
  
                                                           
8Unstandardized measure, defined as (SBP ≥ 140 OR DBP ≥ 90). 
9Access to an improved water source refers to the percentage of the population with reasonable access to an 
adequate amount of water from an improved source, such as a household connection, public standpipe, borehole, 
protected well or spring, and rainwater collection. Unimproved sources include vendors, tanker trucks, and 
unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 liters a person a day 
from a source within one kilometer of the dwelling. 
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Table 1.9 CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) and Improved water source (per cent of population with 
access) 1990-2010 
 
CO2 emission (metric tons per capita) 1990-2010 
 1990 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 2.67 3.5 4.0 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus … 8.8 9.1 
Central Asia … 5.3 6.6 
New EU States 8.23 6.6 6.4 
EU15 7.88 8.4 7.4 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 6.80 6.7 7.1 
North America and Israel 19.01 19.8 16.9 
Total 11.85 10.9 10.1 
Improved water source (% of population with access) 1990-2010 
 1990 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 88.25 94.15 99.67 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 92.11 94.72 96.64 
Central Asia 92.66 86.64 86.75 
New EU States 90.98 94.31 99.75 
EU15 99.78 99.94 99.97 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 100.00 100.00 100.00 
North America and Israel 99.12 99.12 99.12 
Total 96.61 97.28 98.44 
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, World Health Organization and United Nations Children's Fund, Joint Measurement Programme 
CO2 emissions per capita vary greatly in the ECE region; in general the countries with higher GDP per 
capita have higher CO2 emissions per capita than economically less developed countries (see Figure 1.5). 
The biggest CO2 polluting country is the USA with 17.3 metric tons of CO2 per capita per year, while the 
smallest polluter is Tajikistan with 0.4 metric tons. Most of the West ECE region countries managed to 
decrease their per capita CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2010, including the USA. New EU states 
showed positive progress in the 1990s but experienced stagnation or only a small decrease in the 
subsequent decade However, the biggest per capita polluting country in the New EU States, the Czech 
Republic, has been relatively successful in decreasing its CO2 emissions. Further east and south-east, the 
ECE countries had a slight increase in per capita CO2 emissions in the last two decades (see Table 1.9 
and Appendix 2, Table 4).  
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Figure 1.5 GDP per capita (current US$) 2010 and CO2 emission (metric tons per capita) 2010 
 
Source: World Bank Database (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
 
The answer to Hot Question 1  
The answer is more nuanced and useful than would result from simply looking at changing age structures. 
Chronological ageing of the population in the ECE region is going to accelerate in the decades to come 
but relative population ageing as measured by fitness, health, disability and cognitive capacity will 
progress much more slowly than chronological ageing. Age- and sex-specific disability is constantly 
changing in the successive cohorts. This is expected to continue improving in the ECE countries over 
time. None of the ECE countries can escape ageing. But the healthier societies with fitter elderly 
populations will age more slowly, in the respects that matter most, than even chronologically younger 
societies. So for example, when comparing Russia and France, much chronologically younger Russia in 
2050 will have a higher Prospective Old Age Dependency Ratio than much chronologically older France. 
Which of the two societies will be older? In important respects, the answer will be Russia. 
More generally, the answer to Hot Question 1 depends importantly on the educational, social, health and 
welfare systems in each country and on their environmental policies as these affect health. What hampers 
national economic performance is not population ageing, per se. It is rather insufficient activity of the 
national governments and firms to prepare for population ageing and adjust to it. Countries with 
successively healthier, better educated and economically active cohorts entering traditional retirement 
ages may well find themselves better off than if fewer people were reaching retirement age but with lower 
health and cognitive functioning and economic dependency. National governments should design policies 
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to: keep older persons in economic activity by adjusting age at retirement to growing healthy life 
expectancy; institute policies to reduce smoking and obesity; control unhealthy emissions; adjust pension 
schemes to the increasing remaining time people can be expected to remain in pension; and educate 
younger cohorts so as to maintain their economic productivity at older ages. We focus on the policy 
debates and on social and welfare systems that are working toward these goals in Part 2 of the Report. 
Hot Question 2: Is Migration a Threat or Opportunity for Development? 
 
Migration is a principal means by which people try to maintain or improve their wellbeing. Apart from 
forced migration, this motivation frequently succeeds for the individuals and families who migrate, but 
the consequences of migration for the areas entered and those left behind are much more mixed. These 
consequences arise in labour markets, settlement patterns, and characteristics of social cohesion. When 
migration in or out is substantial enough to affect countries’ or areas’ age and/or sex distributions, 
consequences can be long-lasting. Consequences for fertility levels are discussed along with other fertility 
considerations. 
 
Volume of migration 
 
A basic distinction is between migration that occurs within the boundaries of countries and migration that 
crosses international borders. Although many of the processes shaping internal and international 
migration are similar, the controls countries exert over international migration are much greater than those 
within countries. Internal migration is usually a more available option than international migration, 
involving less regulation, smaller distances, lower costs, ease of travel, and less economic, social and 
cultural disruption. Accordingly, in most contexts the rates of internal migration are much greater than the 
rates of international movement. But because international migration influences country-level 
demographic change, we concentrate here on the former.  
While only 3.1 per cent of the world’s population lives outside of their country of birth, this percentage is 
above 10 per cent for nationals of some countries. Foreign-born shares can also be substantial relative to 
the population of countries of destination, with levels above 10 per cent in North America and most of 
Western Europe and Oceania, and parts of South East Asia. In some of those countries, the percentage is 
significantly higher than 10 per cent.   
 
Table 1.10 shows the importance of international migration across the ECE sub-regions in several 
dimensions (Country detail is in Appendix 2. Table 5). In 2000, the EU15, Western Europe non-EU, and 
North America and Israel had substantially larger relative stocks of immigrants than the sub-regions 
farther east and south. Their population proportions also gained over the subsequent decade, while the 
eastern and southern sub-regions held relatively steady. Differences in net migration—number of 
immigrants minus emigrants over a five-year period—largely correspond to these percentage differences. 
However, one important flow is hidden in these regional averages (but evident in the Appendix table), 
that from the former Soviet countries to the Russian Federation. 
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Table 1.10 Migration Stocks and Flows  
 
 
International 
migrant 
stock (% of 
population) 
2000 
 
International 
migrant 
stock (% of 
population) 
2010 
 
Net 
Migration
10
 1996-
2000 
 
Net 
migration 
2006-
2010 
 
Emigration 
rate of tertiary 
educated (% of 
total tertiary 
educated 
population) 
2000 
South-Eastern Europe 3.0 2.6 -130,147 -46,429 8 
Eastern Europe and 
Caucasus 9.0 9.1 1,359,372 728,922 2 
Central Asia 9.4 8.0 -579,374 -282,103 1 
New EU States 3.4 3.4 -138,160 28,481 13 
EU15 8.4 11.0 424,437 948,080 9 
Western Europe - Non EU 
 
15.7 17.5 61,276 174,123 9 
North America and Israel 13.4 15.1 7,607,677 4,483,341 1 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects 
 
Figure 1.6 gives a snapshot of gross international migration flows between 2005-2009, aggregated at the 
level of the ECE sub-regions and other major world regions.11 The size of the bands is proportional to the 
number of migrants, the colours of the bands correspond to the colours of the inner circle segments of 
each region that is sending migrants, and the end points of the bands indicate the regions receiving the 
immigrants. Hence, Eastern Asia is sending many immigrants to the North America and Israel region 
(mostly to North America) and relatively few to EU15. Africa, on the other hand, sends many migrants to 
EU15 but relatively few to North America and Israel. Apart from these instances, the large flow from 
Latin America to North America and flows from Western Asia, the ECE region “trades” people with the 
rest of the world considerably less than do the other world regions. In particular, the counter-flows from 
North America and Europe to Asia are negligible, highlighting the strong impact of migration on the 
redistribution of population. Overall, most international migration occurs within the greater ECE region 
rather than between the ECE and other world regions, and much of that within sub-regions.  
 
  
                                                           
10
 Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that is, the total number of immigrants less the annual 
number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens. Data are five-year estimates.  
11
 These flow data are a time series forecast of the data presented in Abel, Reiomena, and Sander (2013), 
representing the number of people changing country of residence over the five-year period. These cannot be readily 
compared to annual flow statistics published by Eurostat and some countries. 
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Figure 1.6 “Circos” Plot of Gross International Migration Flows 
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Factors influencing international migration12 
 
In general, people may change their place of residence for economic, demographic, migration policy, 
environmental, or political reasons. Often, migration is the result of an interaction of these factors, 
making it difficult to distinguish the relative importance of each. 
 
Most commonly, people migrate to further their economic position or to join family members who 
migrated before them. But other economic and non-economic factors play a role in influencing the timing 
and geography of international migration flows, as the poorest people from the poorest countries are 
generally not the most likely to migrate to the richest countries. Many move with more explicit purposes, 
to reduce different forms of social, economic, political, and environmental vulnerability (Bardsley and 
Hugo, 2013). Such purposeful migration typically spans international borders and often occurs despite 
multiple barriers to movement. Explicit migration policy can play a significant role. For instance, several 
kinds of active private and public recruitment efforts jump-started Turkish migration to Germany 
(Abadan-Unat, 1995; Massey et al., 1993).  
Whatever the original motivation for international migration, it can set in motion a series of social and 
economic changes in both sending and receiving societies, occurring through the progressive expansion 
and elaboration of migrant networks. When a migrant gets a job in a high-wage country, news can spread 
over that person’s social network. Friends and relatives acquire a tie to someone who might lower the 
costs of movement and overcome the barriers to entry. Each new departure from the source country may 
expand the migrant network further. Among the effects in the sending country can be the splitting of 
families, leaving children behind in the care of grandparents. Once begun, international flows thus tend to 
become self-perpetuating and acquire momentum that can persist even after the original conditions have 
disappeared. 
The answer to Hot Question 2  
For many host countries in Western Europe, North America (and the Russian Federation), migration has 
partially compensated for the smaller cohort size of the "native" population compared to the generation of 
their parents. Most migrants migrate in younger adulthood. They contribute to the size of the reproductive 
cohort and therefore contribute to the host society not only by their economic activity but potentially also 
as parents to children born in the country. Moreover, apart from explicit policies to attract student 
migrants, the host country did not bear the burden of their schooling and rearing. When well integrated 
and employed, migrants are an asset for the host society. Apart from migrant worker situations that often 
succeed, the causes of difficulties are invariably inadequate integration, social exclusion and 
unemployment of migrants, challenges that are much easier to state than to overcome. 
On the other hand, in the countries in the East ECE region that have experienced massive net out-
migration such as Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Central 
Asian Republics, and Baltic states, productivity, ageing, family support systems and sustainability are 
negatively affected by the migration losses, despite the remittances by migrant workers. In these 
countries, it will be difficult if not impossible to find substitutes for the out-migrants, whether in the labor 
market or civil society more broadly. Neither increased investments in physical capital and infrastructure 
                                                           
12
 The material in this section is partly based on Abel, Reiomena, and Sander (2013). 
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nor productive uses of remittances can make up for the varied but lost contributions to a society of 
educated and ambitious young adults, gainfully employed.  
 
Altogether, the challenges and opportunities of international migration merge domestic with multinational 
interests like few other phenomena. At the base are first the incentives to migrate and the motivations of 
those who migrate. Following closely are the wellbeing and human rights of particular people, both the 
migrants and those left behind. The effects then spread broadly in both sending and receiving nations. We 
shall see in Part 2 that cooperative international policies, while they are difficult to establish and maintain, 
tend to meet the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities better than when countries act alone 
in their own interests. 
 
Hot Question 3: Is fertility in the ECE region too low? 
Most countries in the ECE region have below replacement or just replacement levels of fertility. The 
concept of replacement fertility is a simple one: to have aggregate fertility of today's women in 
reproductive ages that would allow them to be replaced numerically. Under current mortality conditions 
this implies a fertility level of on average 2.1 children per woman over her reproductive lifetime. In the 
policy debate, this benchmark of replacement fertility as the desired level is very present. Consequently, 
many national governments are concerned that their fertility level is too low if it does not reach 
replacement fertility.  
 
Fertility patterns and trends 
Although most countries in the ECE region belong to the group of countries having a period total fertility 
rate (TFR) below the replacement level, the region represents a very heterogeneous group of countries in 
terms of fertility histories (Table 1.11). In general, the TFR fell significantly in the 1990s in the eastern 
part of the ECE region and then stabilized or even increased slightly in the first decade of the 21st century, 
whereas in the western part of the region this dynamic was much weaker. In all the countries of South-
Eastern Europe the TFR was declining between 1990 and 2010, most substantially in Turkey and Albania 
(from 3.00 in 1990 to 2.07 in 2010 and from 3.2 to 1.41, respectively). The countries of Eastern Europe 
and the Caucasus saw a decline in the TFR after 1990 and a slight increase after 2005. Similar dynamics 
can be observed also in the New EU States. All countries in the above mentioned sub-regions now have a 
TFR of less than 2.1 with the exception of Azerbaijan.  
 
The highest fertility among the ECE countries is in the Central Asian republics. Although their TFR 
dramatically decreased in the 1990s, it increased again in the last several years, now surpassing 2.5 in all 
five republics with the highest levels in Tajikistan (3.58) and Kyrgyzstan (3.08).13 The Western European 
and North American countries and Israel had higher or nearly the same levels of TFR in 2010 as in 1990. 
 
  
                                                           
13Data source UNICEF (2012) 
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Table 1.11 Total Fertility Rate 1990-2050 
 1990 2000 2010 2030 2050 
South-Eastern Europe 2.80 2.17 1.93 1.83 1.72 
Eastern Europe and 
Caucasus 
1.96 1.23 1.53 1.54 1.68 
Central Asia 3.83 2.55 2.37 1.95 1.76 
New EU States 1.90 1.33 1.39 1.52 1.58 
EU15 1.55 1.52 1.65 1.75 1.76 
Western Europe - Non EU 
Member 
1.67 1.66 1.69 1.83 1.86 
North America and Israel 1.90 2.06 1.93 1.94 1.91 
Total 1.94 1.69 1.74 1.77 1.78 
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects and Wittgenstein Centre for Demography 
and Global Human Capital 
This brief overview shows a certain reversal of the long-lasting pattern in which the economically most 
developed and richest countries also experienced the lowest fertility. This is no longer the case, not only 
within the ECE region but also globally with very low fertility in countries such as China and Iran, and 
rapidly decreasing fertility in most of the world’s countries except for sub-Saharan Africa and a few 
Asian countries. How can such a pattern be explained? Is the low fertility in some ECE countries going to 
persist or is it merely in a transition period after which their fertility will stabilize again at higher levels? 
 
A broad demographic, economic and sociology literature exists on different potential explanations of 
fertility decline. They are well summarized in Basten et al. (2013) and we shall follow here these authors’ 
arguments. Several factors act together to determine period fertility as well as long-term fertility trends. 
Reviewing these factors will facilitate understanding not only why fertility has developed in the ECE 
countries as it has but also whether these countries’ fertility can be expected to increase and under what 
conditions. In addition, this review will shed light on the usefulness of the replacement fertility level as an 
ideal and provide a realistic answer to the question of whether the fertility in the ECE region is too low. 
 
Replacement fertility 
 
"In a precise demographic sense, replacement fertility only leads to constant population size and age 
structure in the absence of migration, under constant mortality conditions and the absence of irregular age 
structures. In most existing populations none of these conditions is met. Moreover, it is not clear whether 
constant population size is actually a desirable policy target and how population heterogeneity affects 
such criteria." (Striessnig and Lutz, 2013) 
 
The fertility indicator that is most often interpreted as measuring the current level of fertility of women in 
the reproductive ages is the period total fertility rate (TFR). This indicator is very sensitive to changing in 
timing of fertility among women and in particular to fertility postponement. Several studies have shown 
that this indicator is misleading for these reasons and does not reflect well the actual number of children 
women have over their reproductive life (Sobotka and Lutz, 2011). In this respect, the only absolutely 
reliable indicator is to measure the completed cohort fertility rate of women who have completed their 
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reproductive age. Table 1.13 and Appendix 2 Table 6 show these indicators for women born in 1970 with 
almost completed fertility. Other alternative period measure such as adjusted TFR14 and tempo- and 
parity-adjusted TFR are attempts to overcome the problems of TFR and when compared to cohort fertility 
give much more accurate results (Table 1.13 and Appendix 2, Table 6). Where data permit, the alternative 
TFR indicators should be used rather than the conventional ones (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998; Bongaarts 
and Sobotka, 2012). 
 
Not only numerical replacement matters when we are interested in measuring population sustainability in 
a broader societal context. The productivity of people matters as well. A population constituted of more 
productive but less numerous people can be more sustainable than a population with numeric replacement 
of generations but without increases in productivity. The economic contribution to society differs among 
individuals. This can be taken into account by modelling the productivity contribution of the population 
by the level of education. Striessnig and Lutz (2013) modelled the impact of education on productivity 
differentials and concluded that "if education is assumed to present a cost at young age and results in 
higher productivity during working age, then for most countries the desirable long-term total fertility rate 
turns out to be well below replacement level." 
 
In this context, the employment of the population in economically active ages is very important. If a 
country has a young population with replacement fertility but its youth suffer high unemployment, the 
country is experiencing a burden to the social system rather than contributions to its sustainability. 
Similar issues may arise with long parental leaves for young mothers. Women are not economically active 
during long leaves and often have problems finding an adequate job after labour market absence. Not only 
the women but also the state is losing productivity when women are not provided with adequate options 
to combine parenthood with a professional career. 
Fertility postponement  
 
Postponement of the age of childbearing is a process that is inherently linked to the transition from higher 
to lower fertility levels in the last fifty years. In the West ECE region, the current mean age at first birth 
ranges between 28 and 30 years, four-to-six years later than in the early 1970s (Basten et al., 2013; 
Schmidt et al., 2012). In the East ECE region, the fertility postponement started only after 1989, and the 
mean age at first birth grew from a quite universal level of 23 to levels between 25 and 28. The trends 
suggest that further postponement will take place in the region in the coming years. A slightly different 
situation is found in the Caucasus and Central Asian republics where mean age at first birth has increased 
only slowly and remains under age 25 (Appendix 2, Table 6). 
 
This postponement of first births is explained primarily as the result of the expansion of higher education 
and consequent later entrance into the labour market (Basten et al., 2013; Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 
2012). Other factors include the spread of hormonal contraception, rising economic and employment 
uncertainty in young adulthood, decline of marriage and rise of more unstable forms of partnerships, and 
spread of values incompatible with parenthood (Basten et al., 2013). As a consequence the proportion of 
births to mothers aged 35 and older is increasing, reaching about 24 per cent in Western Europe, 20 per 
cent in North America and Israel and somewhat less in the East ECE region (Table 1.12). Moreover the 
                                                           
14
 An indicator proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) that is based on fertility data by birth order. 
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dynamics over time is very strong. In the countries with the highest proportion of mothers 35+,  such as 
Spain, the proportion of children born to them increased by nearly 10 percentage points over the last ten 
years (from 19.7% in 2000 to 29.7% in 2010).  
 
Table 1.12 Percentage of all live births to mothers, age 35+ years 2000 and 2010 
 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 8.32 12.33 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 5.63 8.03 
Central Asia 5.04 6.74 
New EU States 7.53 12.92 
EU15 17.73 23.57 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 18.11 25.19 
North America and Israel 15.32 20.07 
Total 12.01 16.91 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: UNDP (2011) 
 
In a situation of postponing parenthood, the period indicator most commonly used to measure fertility, the 
TFR, is exposed to a “tempo effect” distortion, particularly strong in the years when the cohorts of 
younger women start postponing their births and older women have already given births to their children 
(Sobotka and Lutz, 2011). This results in low levels of TFR. This effect can explain the particularly low 
TFR in the East ECE countries between roughly 1995 and 2005. However, some observers tend to 
incorrectly interpret these values as implying similarly low cohort fertility levels in the future, suggesting 
an alarmist interpretation. A more accurate estimate of the period fertility is the Adjusted TFR (see Figure 
1.7 to 1.9 and Table 1.13). In almost all countries of the ECE region, the current period TFR is influenced 
by the tempo effect: hence, higher fertility levels should be finally expected when the female cohort of 
today’s childbearing age reaches menopause. The WIC population projections take this into account, 
showing expected TFR levels in 2050 between 1.5 and 2.0 in the countries of the ECE region (for the 
countries’ TFRs and Adjusted TFRs see Appendix 2 Table 6).15 
 
  
                                                           
15
 For countries where data are available we use tempo- and parity-adjusted TFR; where data do not 
allow, we use tempo-adjusted TFR. 
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Figure 1.7: Fertility trends in the Czech Republic, 1988-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ediev et al. 
(2012) 
 
Figure 1.8: Fertility trends in Austria, 1974-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
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Figure 1.9: Fertility trends in Spain, 1980-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
 
Table 1.13 Total Fertility Rate 2010, Adjusted Fertility Rate 2010 and Completed Cohort Fertility 1970 
(children per woman) 
 Total Fertility 
Rate 2010 
Adjusted Total 
Fertility Rate 2010 
Completed Cohort Fertility, 
women born 1970 (Children 
per woman) 
South-Eastern Europe 1.9 2.2 2.87 
Eastern Europe and 
Caucasus 
1.5 1.7 1.59 
Central Asia 2.4 … … 
New EU States 1.4 1.6 1.82 
EU15 1.6 1.8 1.85 
Western Europe - Non 
EU Member 
1.7 1.9 2.04 
North America and 
Israel 
1.9 2.1 2.12 
Total 1.7 1.9 1.94 
Note 1: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Note 2: Adjusted TFR for the individual countries is computed mostly as tempo- and parity-adjusted TFR, where not 
available as Adjusted TFR. 
Source: Ediev (2012) 
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The best indicator for measuring fertility is the completed cohort fertility rate of the generation of women 
close to the end or after the end of their reproductive age. Unfortunately, this cannot be computed for 
women still in the childbearing ages, who may still have more children. Currently, the youngest 
generation with almost complete fertility is the generation of women born in 1970. The lowest 1970 
cohort fertility in the ECE region is registered in Italy (1.46), Spain (1.47), Germany (1.50), and Ukraine 
(1.55). Relatively high fertility of the 1970 cohort, above two children per woman, is found in Turkey, 
USA, Ireland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, France, Cyprus and Albania (see data in Appendix 2 Table 6).  
 
These patterns suggest that the postponement of fertility leads to a different result in different countries. 
Although it seems that fertility postponement in the Nordic countries leads to recuperation and fertility 
levels of around two children per woman, in Spain and Italy it does not. Similar differences can be 
observed among the East ECE countries. In the New EU States, women born in 1970 have cohort fertility 
of around 1.8, a much higher level than would be indicated by the period TFR. However in the Eastern 
European countries, the 1970 cohort fertility is much lower than in the New EU States.  
Cultural factors 
 
Cultural factors determining fertility are important because they create the environment in which women 
and couples make decisions about having children. These factors influence their desire for children 
(fertility intentions), the role they expect to have for themselves after the child is born, and their 
expectations about the cultural environment into which children would be born. The latter expectations 
are strongly linked to gender roles and the importance of religion in the society, as well as to family 
arrangements. 
 
Fertility intentions refer to desired number of children and are most commonly measured among women. 
It is an important indicator because it foreshadows actual fertility behaviour to some extent. Despite some 
problematic points in measurement (Testa et al., 2011), the measure also has high policy relevance for at 
least two reasons. First, desired number of children represents in the aggregate approximately the ideal 
fertility women would like to have. Under the condition of widespread accessibility of modern 
contraceptives, women can achieve their desired intentions. When aggregate fertility is lower than desired 
fertility, it indicates the presence of some obstacles that did not allow women to fulfil their fertility 
desires. To understand these barriers and work on diminishing them is a relevant policy issue. Second, 
pronatalist policies that aim to increase fertility above the desired number of children women actually 
want to have are very unlikely to succeed. 
 
Women in the EU countries have on average a quite stable desire for a two-child family, as shown in 
many consecutive waves of the Eurobarometer survey (Testa, 2012, 2006). The same survey also shows 
that more than one-third of Europeans stop childbearing with fewer children than initially desired (Basten 
et al., 2013; Testa, 2012). At the same time about 10-15 per cent of Europeans respond that they actually 
have more children than they initially desired. Far from all newborn children in the ECE region result 
from careful planning. For example, the proportion of unintended and unwanted pregnancies in the United 
States is very high, about 46 per cent in 2006 (Basten et al., 2013). It is particularly high among never-
married young women and Latinos (Basten et al., 2013; Rocca et al., 2010). More generally, it is 
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estimated that 47 per cent of pregnancies and 22 per cent of births in more developed countries are still 
unintended (Basten et al., 2013; Singh et al., 2010).  
 
Gender relations and gender equality seem to play an important role in the developed countries when it 
comes to childbearing, although the evidence is mixed. The relationships depend on what sort of gender 
equity is measured, whether it is societal (political empowerment), household (division of labour), or 
attitudinal on the individual level (gender role attitudes) (Basten et al., 2013). Some evidence suggests 
that in the countries with more role equality between men and women fertility is higher than in countries 
with less equal gender relationships, even when general economic development and individual affluence 
are taken into account. Research conducted in the Nordic countries implies that gender equity between 
men and women in childcare has a positive impact on the number of children the family has (Duvander et 
al., 2010; Oláh and Bernhardt, 2008).  
 
On the societal level, the Nordic countries are also among those with the highest proportion of women in 
leading positions. For example, they score the highest in the proportion of women in the national 
parliament, already in 1990 and reaching more than 40 per cent in 2010. The East ECE region scores very 
low on this measure, with the proportion of women in national parliaments still well below 20 per cent. 
Central Asia is somewhat higher in 2010 at 20 per cent. Some other Western ECE countries score no 
better. In the USA the share was also well below 20%, as it was in Great Britain, France, Ireland, and 
Greece in 2010 (see Appendix 2 Table 8).  
 
The culturally embedded role expectations for women-mothers also play an important role. In the 
societies where women are expected to devote time fully to childrearing for several years, the decision to 
have a child may be more difficult than in societies where such a social norm is not present. Contrasting 
countries in this respect are the German speaking countries and France. In Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland, women are commonly considered the best prime caregiver for the child until the age of 
three, whereas in France this norm does not exist. High childlessness of women (and especially of higher 
educated women) in the German speaking countries maybe be partly attributed to the conflict between 
career and childrearing that is particularly strong there. Similar conflicting situations for young women 
exist in the East ECE region. Evidence from the Czech Republic from the 2000s shows that particularly 
for women with high education it is difficult to combine a professional career with motherhood, as the 
prevailing public opinion considers long maternity leave (three years) to be the best option for children 
(Chaloupková, 2005; Kulhavý and Bartáková, 2007). In mid-2000 about 92 per cent of Czech women 
stayed on parental leave for at least two years after birth of their child. This is a higher proportion than 
before 1989. The fear that motherhood means personal isolation and a threat to the professional career 
also became widespread among young people without tertiary education (Kulhavý and Bartáková, 2007). 
 
Religion is positively correlated with higher fertility in Western countries when measured by church 
attendance or self-assessed religiosity (Philipov and Berghammer, 2007). It is more individual religious 
practice and membership in a religious community that make the difference rather than mere formal 
adherence to a church. However, even some rather secular societies such as France and Sweden have 
relatively high fertility, while societies like Spain and Italy have among the lowest. Hence, the 
relationship between religion and fertility on the aggregate level is more complex than on the individual 
level (Basten et al., 2013).  
29 
 
 
Sex ratio at birth is normally a biological constant, but in some societies with strong preference for sons it 
may occur that female foetuses are aborted more often, thereby skewing the sex ratio at birth and creating 
imbalances in the age structure. In more general terms, this is a sign of the inferior position of women and 
girls in such societies. In the ECE region, Armenia and Azerbaijan show a skewed sex ratio at birth in 
2010 as do Georgia, Tajikistan, and Albania in 2000 (Appendix 2 Table 8). 
Employment and economic uncertainty 
 
The relationship between employment and economic uncertainty, on the one hand, and fertility, on the 
other hand, has been long observed, ever since the simultaneous development of increasing female labour 
force participation and declining fertility in developed countries. The competition of work experience, 
career growth and accumulation of capital for setting oneself up independently, and the long-time 
commitment connected with childbearing, present conflicting decisions today and much more so for 
young women than for young men. Factors on both the individual and aggregate levels matter for the 
depression of fertility, so that not only the individual experience of unemployment and difficulty finding a 
job matters, but also the social distress from living and working in an environment where unemployment 
threatens and contract duration is limited. Short-term contracts with meagre provisions and higher 
turnover have expanded, in particular, since the 1990s. This development has often resulted in a 
dualization of the labour market where the young have mostly unstable contracts and the older generation 
still regulated ones, pressing particularly on the cohorts in the prime childbearing ages (Basten et al., 
2013). This is particularly the case in the Southern European countries but also in France and elsewhere.  
 
Studies on the impact of the current economic crisis have shown a relationship with fertility across 
countries with different severities of the crisis. In most countries, the previously rising fertility trends 
halted and did not show any further increase after 2009. Some even started to decrease (Sobotka et al., 
2011). Basten et al. (2013) state further that “in a recession, women who are at a point in their life-cycle 
when human capital accumulation is crucial may postpone childbearing to acquire more work experience 
and education. The pervasive long-term and youth unemployment characterised by the recent recession is 
bound to have a large negative impact on household permanent income. It may render childbearing 
unattractive not only for those directly affected by unemployment but also to those threatened by it.” 
The youth unemployment rate (of those aged 15-24 that are not fulltime students) is currently much 
higher than ten years ago in all countries of the ECE region and is also much higher than among the total 
population age 15+ (Table 1.14 and Appendix 2, Table 9). Accordingly, youth unemployment stands at 
more than 40 per cent in Spain, Serbia, Armenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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Figure 1.10: Period TFR in selected countries, 2000-2011 
 
Source: Ediev et al. (2012) 
 
Table 1.14 Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) 200 and 2010 
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) 2000 and 
2010 
 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 15.47 22.17 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 21.12 18.09 
Central Asia 17.30 6.70 
New EU States 26.92 24.32 
EU15 16.95 21.72 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 6.95 8.22 
North America and Israel 9.78 17.95 
Total 16.26 19.94 
Source: International Labour Organization (2011) 
 
Economic uncertainty was a principal reason for the rapid fertility decline in the post-communist 
countries in the first decade of transformation. Sobotka et al. (2008, p. 403) conclude for the case of the 
Czech Republic that “the rapidity of observed changes can be explained as the outcome of a simultaneous 
occurrence of several factors, especially the expansion of higher education, the emergence of new 
opportunities competing with family life, increasing job competition, rising economic uncertainty in 
young adulthood, and changing partnership behaviour”. 
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Migrants’ fertility 
Migrants tend to have higher fertility than the “native” women in the ECE region (Sobotka et al., 2008). 
However, the origin of migrants matters in this regard. Where the second generation is concerned, very 
often they show similar fertility patterns as the “native women”. In this context it is useful to stress that 
“in most European countries with sizeable immigration, migrants’ fertility has had a small positive effect 
on country TFR around 2007 and 2008, ranging from 0.03 in Germany to 0.13 (England and Wales) in 
absolute terms” (Basten et al., 2013). These findings contradict the common wisdom that birth rates 
among immigrants have huge impacts on the domestic fertility rate. 
Biomedical factors 
With the increasing mean age at birth and postponement of conception, the risks that women will not 
succeed in getting pregnant and not carry the pregnancy successfully to term are increasing. Natural 
sterility or the inability to get pregnant increases slowly after age 30 and progresses much faster after age 
40. By age 40 almost 17 per cent of all women are permanently sterile and about 35 per cent of women 
who will try to conceive for the first time will remain childless (Leridon, 2008). This effect combined 
with more and more women postponing childbearing is increasing the demand for assisted reproduction 
services. These are, however, quite costly and at older ages not so successful unless the oocytes (eggs) 
come from a donor woman. In 2008 about 4.6 per cent of children were conceived via assisted 
reproduction in Denmark and about 0.5 per cent in Turkey (according to ESHRE 2011, cited from Basten 
et al., 2013).  
 
Male infecundity and low sperm quality are other factors that may prevent a successful conception. The 
link to age is, however, less direct and the progression of male infecundity while ageing is much slower 
and later in life than among women. A secular decline in sperm quality over time is observed in some 
biomedical research, but the evidence and causes are still inconclusive. 
 
Education 
Traditionally, higher levels of education of women have been associated with lower fertility. However, 
today in the low fertility countries where higher education of women is increasing, this relationship is less 
straightforward and less universal. There are multiple effects that higher education has on fertility 
behaviour. As more women today get higher education these effects are relevant for a larger share of the 
cohorts in the prime reproductive age. First, the fact that women spend more years in education leads to a 
postponement of childbearing into higher ages, since it is generally considered undesirable to have 
children during the studies. Moreover, women with higher education (and therefore higher time and 
financial investment in education) may want to establish themselves in the labour market and create 
financial independence for themselves before considering a career break due to childbearing. This relates 
to the second point, that higher educated women have higher opportunity costs of childbearing. This may 
contribute not only to delay but also to decline of fertility (Basten et al., 2013).  
 
Gender equality and accessible formal childcare seem to be particularly important for the fertility decision 
of highly educated women (Van Bavel and Różańska-Putek, 2010)). It has been shown that in the Nordic 
countries, "the fertility gradient by level of education has almost disappeared for women, and parity 
progression ratios to a second and third child are positively associated with women's education level" 
(Basten et al., 2013; see also Kravdal and Rindfuss, 2008). It seems that this positive association is linked 
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to generous family policies in the Nordic countries, to accessible child care for children under the age of 
three, and to promotion of gender equity in family life (Basten et al., 2013; see also Kravdal and Rindfuss, 
2008) .  
 
In the ECE countries where female education is growing rapidly, the key factor in maintaining higher 
fertility or increasing it is to give women the opportunity to combine work and family life and to promote 
gender equality in the cultural framework, and therefore in women’s and couples’ mindset.  
 
Reproductive health 
The maternal mortality ratio16 in the ECE region has generally declined in the last two decades. The West 
ECE region had a very low maternal mortality ratio already in 1990 and has maintained these very low 
levels. The eastern ECE countries have made good progress in substantially decreasing maternal mortality 
over the last two decades (Table 1.15 and Appendix 2, Table 7). In particular, the New EU States have 
made significant progress, with some countries achieving comparable levels of maternal mortality with 
the West ECE countries. Countries such as Estonia have championed the decrease in maternal mortality 
from 48 to 5 in the last two decades.  
 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus still have relatively high maternal mortality ratios but 
have slowly progressed compared to the 1990 estimates. The highest levels are in the Central Asian 
republics and Georgia with levels above 50 (except for Uzbekistan, where it is much lower). Although in 
most countries maternal mortality decreased over time, the USA was one of the few countries with an 
increase between 2000 and 2010. The US maternal mortality ratio in 2010 was at comparable levels to 
Turkey (ratio of 21).  
 
Table 1.15 Maternal Mortality Ratio (Modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) 
 
 1990 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 57 34 19 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 65 51 33 
Central Asia 76 62 45 
New EU States 51 20 13 
EU15 11 8 7 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 8 7 8 
North America and Israel 11 13 20 
Total 32 23 19 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO and the World Bank(2012) 
 
The proportion of teenage mothers has been decreasing in the ECE region and is very low in all the sub-
regions. Less than five per cent of all children are born to teenage mothers on average in the ECE region 
with the highest proportion in Georgia at 13 per cent (Table 1.16 and Appendix 2, Table 6). Eastern 
                                                           
16The maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die during pregnancy and childbirth, per 100,000 live 
births. Here we use modeled estimates based on regression models with information on fertility, birth attendants, and 
HIV prevalence. Data source: World Bank Database 
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Europe and the Caucasus have experienced a large decrease in the proportion of young mothers in the last 
decade, particularly in Ukraine, Armenia, and Belarus.  
 
The decrease in teenage pregnancies could be caused by a higher prevalence of contraception and spread 
of modern contraceptives or by increased abortions among teenage pregnant women. In the East ECE 
region where the decrease in the proportion of newborns to teenage mothers was the strongest, we do not 
observe an increase in abortions of teenage women (as far as measured by the number of abortions per 
1000 live births). This means that most of the decrease in teenage births had to be due to more efficient 
and more frequent contraceptive use.  
 
When teenage pregnancy happens, abortion is a much more common outcome in West ECE countries 
than in the East (Table 1.17. For individual country data see Appendix 2, Table 7). Most of the Western 
European countries with available data have more teenage pregnancies ending in abortion than in live 
births and this is a growing tendency over time. In Central Asia and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the 
abortion outcome is the least frequent with a decreasing tendency over time. 
 
Table 1.16 Percentage of Live births to mothers, age under 20, 2000 and 2010 
 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 8.1 5.9 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 14.1 8.4 
Central Asia 7.3 4.4 
New EU States 9.3 6.1 
EU15 4.2 3.1 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 1.7 1.3 
North America and Israel 3.3 2.3 
Total 7.3 4.7 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: UNDP (2011) 
 
In general however, abortion rates are declining in the ECE region. This trend is particularly strong in the 
East ECE countries where the abortion rate was very high in the past. Still today, with the exception of 
some Central Asian Republics, the ECE countries have a higher number of abortions per 1000 live births 
than in Western Europe. Currently the highest ratio of abortions to live births is in Russia, Hungary, 
Estonia and Romania, where for every two live births there is one abortion. Nevertheless, in particular in 
Russia, the decrease in abortion over the last decade was very significant, although in 2000 there were 
still more pregnancies ended by abortion than by birth of a child (Table 1.17, Appendix 2 Table 7). 
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Table 1.17 Abortions per 1000 live births, age under 20 and total, 2000 and 2010 
 
Abortions per 1000 live births, age under 20 years old 2000-2010 
 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 184 206 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 540 226 
Central Asia 192 119 
New EU States 646 555 
EU15 1032 1206 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 1658 1724 
North America and Israel 622 687 
Total 831 848 
Abortions per 1000 live births  2000-2010 
 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 473 87 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 1291 477 
Central Asia 254 137 
New EU States 464 231 
EU15 217 206 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 192 184 
North America and Israel 142 118 
Total 568 269 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: UNDP (2011) 
 
Prevalence of HIV in the ECE region has shown a significant increase, especially in the last two decades. 
In particular, HIV prevalence in the population aged 15-49 has exhibited an increasing trend over the last 
20 years, especially in some countries (Table 1.18 and Appendix 2, Table 7).17 For instance, Ukraine and 
Macedonia have shown substantially increased HIV prevalence between 1990 and 2000. Also, Estonia 
and Latvia have shown large increases in HIV prevalence. Causes of the HIV epidemic vary across 
countries in the Region. In Estonia, injecting drug users are the most at risk (Rüütel et al., 2011). Other 
countries have shown similar trends wherein the people at risk are intra-venal drug users, men having sex 
with men, and young people in the 15-24 age group. 
 
  
                                                           
17Prevalence of HIV refers to the percentage of people ages 15-49 who are infected with HIV. Data source: World 
Bank Database 
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Table 1.18 Prevalence of HIV, total (per cent of population aged 15-49)1990-2010 
 1990 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 0.10 0.56 0.59 
Central Asia 0.10 0.12 0.24 
New EU States 0.10 0.11 0.13 
EU15 0.21 0.24 0.32 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 0.16 0.22 0.32 
North America and Israel 0.46 0.56 0.65 
Total 0.25 0.34 0.41 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: UNAIDS (2012) 
 
 
The answer to Hot Question 3 
 
Optimal fertility is not replacement fertility, not 2.1 children per woman. Optimal fertility is not 
replacement fertility because the quality of people in terms of their education, health, and productivity 
matters for the things nations value at least as much as the number of people.  Population size and its 
composition by age and sex are only one part of the story (Striessnig and Lutz, 2013). In most of the ECE 
countries, where reproductive and general health is good and education levels high, optimal fertility lies 
below 2.1. Although nations with exceptionally low fertility might seek to increase it, investing in people, 
their education and work opportunities, their health and wellbeing as well as in gender equality is 
generally more important. 
 
Hot Question 4: Are ECE Countries becoming less equal societies?  
 
Among the world’s more developed countries, there is a pervasive question of whether the resources and 
products of society are as equally shared as they should be. This concern often extends beyond 
employment and money to other aspects of wellbeing—education, health, and the aggregated concept of 
social cohesion. This generalized concern about inequality, arguably as strong in the ECE region as 
elsewhere, is both generated and reflected in the popular press, academic debates, and political 
deliberations. It features many dimensions and distinctions that are easily confused.   
 
Concepts of inequality 
 
Economic inequality is nearly always an important component of the discussion. One distinction that 
matters is between income and wealth, the former being a flow per unit time, the other a stock or 
accumulation, built up from past positive and negative flows. How unequally income may be distributed 
in a society, wealth is even less equally distributed. So where wealth matters more, as in support during 
retirement, surviving a period of sickness or unemployment, buying property, or leaving bequests to one’s 
heirs, wealth is the relevant concept. Another distinction is between what economists call the factor and 
personal distributions of income. The factor distribution of income describes how income is divided 
among categories of factors of production, that is, between labour earnings, returns to financial 
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investments, profits, and rent to land owners. By contrast, the personal distribution of income describes 
how the total income pie is divided up among persons or households. 
 
The personal distribution of income is the dimension of monetary inequality most reliably measured in 
official statistics and, at the same time, most prominently noted and discussed.  Indeed, as we shall see in 
Part 2, much policy concern in ECE region countries focuses on this dimension. This concern can take 
different forms depending on the populations of interest: intergenerational inequality, gender inequality, 
urban-rural inequality, regional inequality, and migrant or ethnic inequality. 
 
Population indicators 
Accordingly, we here examine briefly several measures of inequality that allow comparisons over time.  
We will find that sub-regions of the ECE region vary considerably according to these measures, with 
individual countries varying even more. Unfortunately, data availability also varies.   
 
Table 1.19 displays two measures, the Gini Index and the poverty gap at $2 a day, both for 2000 and 2010 
for regions supplying data. Data for particular countries are in Appendix 2, Table 9. With perfect equality 
and complete inequality corresponding to 0.0 and 1.0 respectively, the Gini Index has in fact declined 
over this period in each included sub-region, indicating declines in income inequality. Only seven 
countries of the 36 with data for both years experienced increasing inequality by this measure. These 
include Germany and Sweden, although both, especially Sweden, had among the most equal income 
distributions of all the Region’s countries in both years.  
 
Table 1.19 Gini Index and Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (per cent) 2000 and 2010 
 
 Gini Index 
2000 
Gini Index 
2010 
Poverty 
Gap at $2 
a day 2000 
Poverty Gap 
at $2 a day 
2010 
South-Eastern Europe 40.3 37.6 1.3 0.5 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 36.7 36.2 2.5 0.3 
Central Asia 41.1 30.8 18.9 2.9 
New EU States 31.7 29.6 1.3 0.2 
EU15 32.6 31.0 … … 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 30.6 28.3 … … 
North America and Israel 40.0 37.3 … … 
Total 36.5 34.1 3.6 0.5 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: UNDP (2011) and World Bank (2012) 
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The same story is told by data on the poverty gap at $2 a day.18 This measure of impoverishment has 
fallen markedly between 2000 and 2010 in the four sub-regions with published data and in every country 
but one.   
 
These data extend only to 2010 and do not show changes within the ten-year trend. Subsequent indicators 
strongly suggest that the financial crisis that began in 2008 has taken its toll on income equality, reversing 
the trend in many countries in the region. However, research has yet to adequately partition the 
responsibility for this reversal between the recession, itself, and government actions to deal with the 
recession and other factors, for example, attempts to control the levels of national debt (Jenkins et al., 
2013). 
 
Unemployment is a strong contributor to poverty, although measures are very sensitive to current 
economic conditions. Reporting countries in the ECE region show no consistent pattern of change in the 
unemployment rate between 2000 and 2010, with 26 countries reporting an increase and 15 countries a 
decrease. This pattern repeats for the unemployment rate for ages 15-24 (see Table 1.20). These 
differences likely reflect the different paths of economic recovery or stagnation following the great 
recession, with most countries still suffering. 
 
Table 1.20 Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) 2000 and 2010 
 
 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 15.5 22.2 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 21.1 18.1 
Central Asia 17.3 6.7 
New EU States 26.9 24.3 
EU15 16.9 21.7 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 6.9 8.2 
North America and Israel 9.8 18.0 
Total 16.3 19.9 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: International Labour Organization (2011)  
 
Subpopulation indicators 
 
Other indicators can suggest less directly the course of inequality over time by charting the changing 
wellbeing of segments of the population most likely to be disadvantaged. This evidence suggests a less 
consistently favourable picture than do the general income and poverty indicators. Looking first at 
children, the ratio of children in residential care (per 100,000 population aged 0-17) declined between 
2000 and 2010 in 14 of the 23 countries of the region for which this indicator is reported, but rose in nine 
(see Table 1.21). The highest proportions in 2010 were in Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. 
This pattern can be complemented by the cross section picture of the child poverty rate in 2008, as 
                                                           
18
 The poverty gap is the mean distance below the poverty line (in this case $2) as a proportion of the poverty line 
where the mean is taken over the whole population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap. A larger 
poverty gap means more poverty. 
38 
 
reported by the OECD. Israel, Turkey and the USA are the only reporting countries with rates of child 
poverty above 20 per cent, indicating clearly that high GDP per-capita is not a guarantor of low child 
poverty. Policy makes a difference. Spain and Portugal are close behind. However, only Turkey among 
countries in the South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Caucasus, and Central Asia regions reports 
this statistic; some of the missing countries are likely among those with high child poverty rates.       
 
Table 1.21 Rate of children in residential care (per 100,000 population aged 0-17) 1990-2010 
 
 1990 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 234 245 239 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 970 835 1097 
Central Asia 280 242 1182 
New EU States 688 568 690 
EU15 … … … 
Western Europe - Non EU Member … … … 
North America and Israel … … … 
Total 815 702 946 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: UNICEF (2012) 
 
At the other end of the life cycle, people nearing and exceeding retirement age may also be at elevated 
risk of poverty. Of these, statistics on percentage of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2010 
indicate that women are at higher risk than men in every country in the EU and Europe more broadly, and 
at all three age groups, 50-64, 65-74, and 75+ (The other sub-regions, along with Israel and USA, do not 
report.). This completely consistent gender difference in a comprehensive risk measure is the most 
systematic of all the indicators examined in this report. Given the range of countries included, there is no 
reason to expect exceptions in the countries not included.  
Some diseases show consistently higher incidence among the poor. The incidence of tuberculosis tends to 
be much higher in low-income populations. Among the sub-regions, it rose between 2000 and 2010 in 
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and Central Asia (see Table 1.22), suggesting that in some of the poorer 
countries, the less well-off portions of the population may have suffered declining health conditions over 
the decade.  Among the New EU States, four countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Malta—
experienced rising incidence. Every country in the other sub-regions experienced declining incidence. 
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Table 1.22 Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) 2000 and 2010 
 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 37 27 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 142 104 
Central Asia 287 136 
New EU States 68 39 
EU15 13 8 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 8 6 
North America and Israel 7 4 
Total 56 34 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: WHO  
 
Disease and other conditions of poverty can vary between urban and rural populations. These 
relationships are more pronounced and systematic in less developed countries than in the ECE region. 
Nevertheless, urbanization is a process of considerable predictability over time and related to several 
outcome indicators of interest in this Report. In the region as a whole, the proportion of persons living in 
an urban place rose from 71.3 to 73.5 between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 1.23). However, 11 countries, 
entirely in Central Asia and the New EU States, became less urban over the decade. Many of these were 
already among the least urbanized, so their regression in this regard is something of an anomaly.  It may 
reflect return migration to rural areas, and even to subsistence agriculture, during particularly 
unfavourable urban economic conditions in the latter year. 
 
Table 1.23 Urban population (per cent of total) 2000 and 2010 
 2000 2010 
South-Eastern Europe 62 67 
Eastern Europe and Caucasus 70 71 
Central Asia 42 41 
New EU States 62 62 
EU15 74 77 
Western Europe - Non EU Member 75 76 
North America and Israel 79 82 
Total 71 73 
Note: Please note that the regional averages may be biased by missing country-specific data 
Source: United Nations (2012) 
 
A particular concern in many countries of the region, especially in Europe and North America, is the 
weakening of the “middle class” and related concern about the growing distance between income and 
wealth of the upper part of the distribution from those in the middle. Countries that may be considered 
progressive in their poverty policies now find evidence of these trends that affect the rest of their 
populations. These tendencies emerged first in the English-speaking countries and recently spread to 
much of Western Europe, although there are exceptions (see Bigot et al., 2012). Research is just 
beginning to understand the reasons for this development and the patterns of policies that may be 
contributing to it or, at least, failing to stop it. This research is well organized and presented in papers 
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associated with the Luxembourg Income Study (see particularly Kollmeyer, 2012). Dallinger (2013) 
presents strong evidence for a range of developed countries, including many in the ECE region, that 
increased female employment reduces income inequality, but increased prevalence of single-mother 
families heightens it.   
 
The answer to Hot Question 4 
Economic inequality encompasses flows of income that over time produce stocks of wealth. Beyond 
economics, inequality encompasses opportunities to succeed as well as outcomes of relative success or 
failure.  And success has many dimensions—political, social, and economic—while spanning many 
distinctions—age, gender, ethnicity and geography. Historically, inequality is a concept of little note in 
poor societies, coming to the fore instead as nations develop. Within the ECE region, both concern about 
inequality and data to inform this concern are widespread.   
 
General indicators of economic inequality show decreasing inequality in 80 per cent of the countries of 
the region from 2000 to 2010. However, recent evidence points to a slowly shrinking middle class in 
North America and the countries of Western Europe. Movement out of the middle class seems to be 
occurring at both ends, into both the higher income group and the lower. Beyond economic 
considerations, trends in indicators of child and youth wellbeing show worsening conditions in many of 
the countries over this same period. In every country, older women are at greater risk of poverty or social 
exclusion than men of the same age. These trends indicate the importance of focusing on populations at 
risk, when describing and analysing inequality, not just country-level indicators, as well as looking 
beyond the obvious economic indicators. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The four hot questions addressed in this report have answers. 
 
1. Is population ageing a threat for the ECE countries?   
In coming decades we can expect older populations in the ECE region but with more people staying 
healthy into higher ages, remaining independent and capable of economic activity, and without being a 
larger burden to health care systems than in the past. How this potential of fitter elderly shall be realized 
is not a demographic question but instead an issue of appropriate adjustment of the social and welfare 
systems. The experiences of countries that are now making appropriate adjustments strongly suggest that 
it can be done. More than financial means, political will, acting on the strong and encouraging evidence 
summarized here, is the crucial driver. 
2. Is migration a threat or opportunity for development? 
Migration among countries in the ECE region and into some of these countries from outside the region is 
also likely to increase. The only effective countervailing force would be equalization of economic 
opportunity across countries or much stronger and effective legal barriers. Neither of these is likely to 
happen on a scale that would much reduce the powerful underlying incentives to migrate or people’s 
ability to respond. As it is the younger, better trained, and more risk-tolerant individuals who tend to pick 
up and move, the sending countries are likely to be harmed. On the other end, receiving countries can 
gain substantially, but this is not a foregone conclusion.  It is clear from common experience, not just the 
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confirming research, that effective opportunities for employment and social integration in the host 
countries are essential, without which international migration can constitute a burden for both countries, 
even if it improves the wellbeing of the migrants. 
3. Is fertility in the ECE region too low? 
The course of fertility in the region is difficult to predict, although the WIC projections under the 
Continuation scenario, as well as other projections, indicate fertility rates that may rise somewhat in the 
lowest fertility countries and decline slowly in others. Family- and gender-related policies that reduce the 
time and money trade-offs between employment and childbearing for women can moderate very low 
fertility. However, research indicates that, in the fertility range of most if not all countries in the ECE 
region, it is far more important to invest in the education, health and gender equality than to spend 
substantial resources trying to increase the population through higher fertility. The optimal fertility in 
most ECE countries is below the replacement fertility level of 2.1. This results from the increased 
productivity of people with higher education and better health, which is more prevalent among the young 
than among the older cohorts. In West ECE countries, moreover, net migration gains add to the cohorts of 
reproductive age. In the East ECE countries, on the other hand, the net migration losses have a negative 
impact on the size of the cohorts of reproductive age. In neither case does the replacement fertility of 2.1 
assure a sustainable cohort succession. The misleading benchmark of replacement fertility should not be 
used as a measure of desirable national fertility levels.      
4. Are ECE countries becoming less equal societies? 
Inequality of economic and social outcomes, and even of opportunities, still persists among the members 
of society in every ECE country, as indeed in every other country in the world. Still, many ECE countries 
are among the international leaders in addressing inequality and creating equal opportunities, and the 
general situation is improving in most. Since 2008, the financial crisis and the Euro crisis have however 
led to a reversal of trends in several countries in the region. Evidence suggests, that children, young 
adults, older women and some ethnic minorities are the most vulnerable. Older women are at higher risk 
of poverty or social exclusion than are men in every country, the most universally consistent pattern 
reported here. 
Answers to these four questions are interrelated through our two cross-cutting themes: 
 
• Investment in human capital, particularly education and health, is essential. 
• Societies can prosper without growing populations. 
 
Indeed, concerted attention to the first theme—in families, communities, and at the national and EU 
level—insures the second theme. Neither experience nor the research that analyses it has so far revealed 
just how policy can effectively induce either higher fertility or slower numerical ageing. How to invest in 
human capital to meet people’s and societies’ objectives for wellbeing, however, is well established. Part 
2 now examines the policy environments in the ECE region that have shown the most promise. 
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Part 2: Policy Responses and Best Practices 
Governments in the ECE Region, as elsewhere, have important concerns beyond the four Hot Questions 
that have motivated our analysis of trends. However, as this analysis has suggested, these trends extend 
their influence widely and deeply into multiple aspects of people’s lives and of governments’ ability to 
influence people’s behaviour and increase their wellbeing. Accordingly, we now turn to an examination 
of government policy in the ECE Region, casting the net broadly across the domain of policy concerns 
that are known through research to influence the outcomes of interest in this report. It remains useful to 
do so under the rubric of the same Hot Questions. 
Hot Question 1. Is population ageing a threat for the ECE countries? 
The role of health care system and preventive health care 
Health care, its organisation, its financing, its equity and accessibility are crucial for population health 
outcomes, including prevention of disease. All countries in the ECE Region have policies and laws 
establishing primary and secondary health care access for the population residing in their territories. The 
health care systems in the ECE region are generally financed through taxation, social insurance 
contributions, voluntary insurance premia and out-of-pocket payments or user charges. Most of the West 
ECE countries and the New EU States cover the health expenditure through a combination of revenues 
from taxation and social health insurance. Out-of-pocket payment and private schemes account often for 
less than 15 % of expenditure on health care in these countries. The exceptions in Western Europe are 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland that have 30 % or more expenditure on health from private 
sources (Mossialos et al., 2002). The various forms of prepayment allow for a health care that is largely 
free at the point of use. Many countries in West ECE Region have also special funds that cover the basic 
and emergency health care to population segments that are out the insurance schemes such as homeless, 
asylum seekers, or illegal immigrants. In the U.S., insurance plans differ so much among states, public 
and private providers, and categories of services, that generalization is difficult.  
The non-EU post-communist countries, but also Romania and Bulgaria, witnessed a deterioration in 
health care provision in the last twenty years as compared to the situation before 1989. In most of these 
countries the situation is improving slightly in recent years but is far from being stabilized. The post-
communist transition and macroeconomic context in many East-European countries led to a sizeable 
decline in state revenues and therefore also in sources for payment for health care. During state socialism 
there existed a constitutional right to health care for all. Health care provision was universal and unrelated 
to contribution status. This contrasts with the situation in the West ECE countries where the system of 
health care coverage and public insurance developed progressively.  
A legacy of the communist system was an incompatibility of health care contributions and expenditures, 
which were usually larger than the contributions (Mossialos et al., 2002). The result was unsustainability 
of the health care systems in many post-communist countries after 1989. The pre-payment of health care 
has nearly collapsed there, so that most of the health care has been covered by out-of-pocket payments 
including so-called informal payments. In Caucasus and Central Asian Republics out-of-pocket payments 
are estimated to account for more than half of total health expenditure. This deterioration of health care 
has had a negative impact on primary and preventive health care availability, geographic accessibility of 
health care, and affordability for large segments of the population. The collapse of the socialist health care 
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systems had far reaching consequences and certainly is one of the determining factors in the increased 
mortality and decreased life expectancy in nearly all post-soviet countries in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
The soviet system of organisation of health care survives in a different stage of transformation in all the 
post-soviet countries. It was designed to provide universal care and cover all the territory. This system 
suffered, however, from many drawbacks, including high centralisation, over-orientation to inpatient 
hospital care at the expense of primary care, and insufficient coverage by general practitioners. In the 
Central Asian republics in the post-soviet era the hierarchical system of care remained in place but the 
infrastructure has deteriorated, sometimes lacking even basic amenities such as running water (McKee et 
al., 2002). Hospitals dominate the health care system in the post-soviet republics consuming most of the 
health care expenditures. In Central Asian republics it is as high as 70% (McKee et al. 2002). This results 
in an excess in impatient care, too many hospital beds per capita, and non-necessary long stays of patients 
under hospital care. The low quality and low accessibility of primary health care both geographically and 
financially lead to significant inequalities in terms of health outcomes in these countries. In Kazakhstan in 
2010 life expectancy at birth varied between 66.3 in the North Kazakhstan oblast and 73.2 in Astana city. 
There were also strong variations in infant and maternal mortality (Katsaga et al., 2012). There are no 
national screening programmes in most of the post-soviet countries although, for example, in Russia an 
opportunistic screening is provided through the periodic health check that people expected to attend.  
In most of the countries in this sub-region, political representatives started to pay higher attention to the 
health status of the population and to the health care services and system of provision in the last decade. 
Russia has introduced a National Priority Project-Health in 2006 to improve health prevention 
programmes and mother and child health services. This programme is thought to have some partial 
success and could have contributed to the decreases in maternal, perinatal, and infant mortality, in 
tuberculosis mortality, and through early detection in cancer (Golikova, 2010). However the reforms need 
to be taken further. Particular attention should be paid to the efficiency of expenditures in the 
underfinanced health care sector. For example „the efficiency of social spending in the Russian 
Federation, including health expenditure, has been assessed as poor because similar health outcomes in 
terms of mortality as in the Russian Federation are observed in other countries spending 30–40 per cent 
less on health“ (Popovich et al., 2011, p. 23).  
Remedies to the health care system in the post-soviet countries will not be easy to devise and put into 
effect. Doing so is highly dependent on overall economic development and the institutional capacity of 
the countries, conditions made even more difficult in the recent global recession. In particular, the 
prevalence of out-of-pocket payment for health care is unsustainable, particularly when a priority of the 
health care system in the post-soviet countries is to promote equity in access to health care. This is a hard 
goal in itself since social inequality is rising, as are the disparities between incomes of rural and urban 
populations.  
Another urgent issue is to respond to the pressure for privatization. A hasty privatization of health care 
services may deteriorate even more the accessibility of health care and the possibility of public control in 
these countries with still a relatively poor financial systems and control mechanisms.  
A comparative analysis of health care systems in the ECE region reveals that there does not exist one-fit-
for-all model of health care system financing and organisation. Instead, a functional health care system 
and its supporting revenue potential reflect a fragile balance across a wide range of factors including 
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political structures (including administrative capacity and level of corruption), economic activity (of 
population, and as reflected in overall GDP), and external pressures (such as EU directives), but also 
social values (such as support for welfare state, prevalence of informal payments, and the rule of law), 
and environmental factors (such as occurrence of war, epidemics, and revolutions) (Mossialos et al., 
2002). The demographic profile of the national population (including age structure, household structure, 
and level of urbanization) influences the balance of the health care systems as well, but are not generally 
dominant over the other factors mentioned above.  
There are apparent advantages of publicly funded health care systems in terms of equity and efficiency, 
including free access at the point of use, extensive risk pooling, near universal coverage and cost control. 
In comparison with publically funded care, user charges, out-of-pocket payment and other features of 
voluntary health insurance schemes are dependent on ability to pay. In addition, risk pooling is limited 
and cost control tends to be weaker (Mossialos et al., 2002). The introduction of user charges in many 
ECE countries reflects an effort to reduce unnecessary or excessive use of services and to raise additional 
revenues. However they tend to have adverse outcomes because they deter both unnecessary and 
necessary services. The user charges may also have adverse effects on the population in danger of social 
exclusion that may be particularly reluctant to immediate payments for health care.  
Long term care and active ageing 
The European Commission (2013) defines long-term care (LTC) as "a range of medical and social 
services for persons who are dependent on help with basic activities of daily living, caused by chronic 
conditions of physical or mental disability." Long-term care operates at the boundaries between health 
care and social care. Different divisions of responsibilities between families and public, different 
organisations of health care and social care, as well as differences in defining boundaries between medical 
and social care result in great variations of long-term care services, their organization, and their role 
within the social protection systems of the ECE countries. 
In the future, we can expect that the need for long term care services will increase as the population is 
ageing and the number of oldest olds is growing both in absolute and relative terms in all ECE countries. 
Even if we can expect an increase in healthy life expectancy and postponement of disabilities into later 
ages, this cannot mitigate completely the effect of the large absolute increase of the elderly population. 
All ECE countries do have policies, programs, and strategies to deal with LTC. The challenge of ageing is 
to adjust and reform these systems so as to provide sufficient and effective care at acceptable costs to the 
growing number of users.  
At present, the backbone of any long term care system is family caregivers. In the OECD countries more 
than ten per cent of adults are providing care for frail people. The proportion is the highest in Italy and 
Spain. Two-thirds of informal caregivers aged over 50 are women. The informal caregivers usually 
provide care for less than ten hours per week and are unpaid (Colombo et al., 2011). More intense 
informal care is very demanding and is not generally well rewarded. High intensity care giving is 
associated with a reduction in labour supply for paid work, a higher risk of poverty, and a 20 % higher 
prevalence of mental health problems among family caregivers, than non-caregivers (Colombo et al., 
2011). The reliance on the family care-givers may be problematic in the future because of the higher 
employment participation of women, expected work activity into later ages, smaller families, and higher 
education of women. According to a survey, most people in the OECD countries agree that the system of 
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long term care relies too much on the informal care of relatives. This feeling is particularly strong in the 
new EU countries reaching more than 80 per cent of those surveyed. These are also the countries with the 
lowest expenditures on long term care (as per cent of GDP) of all OECD countries. In the future, the 
engagement of family members will most likely shift even more towards less time consuming activities 
and financial support. This is why the pool of formal care givers should be broadened. 
Formal care givers are usually found in institutional care settings. Still, in many countries in the ECE 
Region it is increasingly common to have a formal care giver in a home care setting, usually immigrant 
females. This situation is very widespread in Israel and Italy, but also in Austria and other West ECE 
countries. These workers in long term care are facing difficult working circumstances both physically and 
psychologically and at relatively low pay. This leads to undesirable results such as high turnover and low 
retention of workers, and often low quality of services and low productivity.  
Although most LTC users receive the services at home (67 per cent in OECD countries) most of the LTC 
spending is consumed by institutional care (62 per cent of total LTC expenditure in the OECD). 
Institutional care may be more costly because the more care-intensive patients tend to be treated in 
institutional care, but the observed disproportion of expenditure is unlikely to be a sole reflection of that. 
Home care is less costly and more convenient for most of the care recipients. The trend in the West ECE 
countries is towards deinstitutionalization of LTC and individualization of care (see the example of 
Denmark below). 
In the East ECE region LTC services are less effective, more underfinanced, and generally less 
developed. The weight of LTC on family members is high. There is often lack of coordination of care 
between health and social protection authorities (for example in Russia, Czech Republic, or Slovakia). 
The capacities of LTC institutional care are insufficient and as a result many LTC patients are staying in 
hospitals beyond their need for inpatient hospital care. This makes such care costly and ineffective. 
Accessibility of LTC services tends to be regionally uneven, in particular in Russia, and Central Asian 
republics. The best services are in the big towns whereas they are scarce in rural areas.   
LTC services are very well developed in the Nordic countries. Denmark is working toward an approach to 
long-term care that takes into account individual needs of patients, keeping them as long as possible in 
their own homes with only in-house care and assistance. This is a decentralized system linked to a range 
of preventive care services including medical care, rehabilitation, and cognitive training. 
Long-term care facilities are varied and numerous in Denmark including conventional nursing homes, 
psychiatric nursing homes, small apartments (located adjacent to nursing homes and providing basic 
medical care), group homes and foster homes (Olejaz et al., 2012). Services of LTC as well as 
rehabilitation are decentralized, mainly under the responsibilities of municipalities. The service needs are 
assessed together by the general practitioner and the client, special assistance is available to inform clients 
about all care options and to assist in finding the best individually tailored solutions as well as to help fill 
out necessary forms. Services are provided by nursing homes and also in protected housing where clients 
have nursing service at their disposal according to their individual needs. These services resemble rental 
housing with expenses covered by the clients, themselves. The expenses of low-income clients are paid 
from a proportion of their old-age pension allowance (Olejaz et al., 2012).  
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Home nurses offer day and night services for patient education, care and treatment, as well as help filling 
out applications for various needs. All disabled or ill individuals can have an emergency or safety call 
system installed in their home that provides them with direct 24-hour contact to their public health nurse 
(Olejaz et al., 2012). Denmark is one of few OECD countries that spend more money on home care than 
on LTC in institutions. Older people in need of another living arrangement for health reasons may be 
offered a more suitable residence from the array of specially designed housing with different degrees of 
nursing and other assistance.  
Denmark is also advanced in providing support for informal caregivers. Someone who wishes to be an 
informal caregiver for a close relative may be employed by the municipality. If the care needed is 
equivalent to a full time job and after fulfilling some formal criteria, an informal caregiver can be 
employed for up to six month by the municipality and benefit from a salary that corresponds 
approximately to three-quarters of the average annual Danish income. Relatively favourable conditions of 
leave are also given to people who wish to care for a relative with a terminal illness. About 80 per cent of 
Danish establishments offer care leave to their employees, which makes Denmark the leader among 
OECD countries (Colombo et al., 2011).  
Active ageing and pension systems 
Increasing longevity is a reality in all ECE countries today and in West ECE countries already for several 
decades (Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2009; Vanhuysse and Goerres, 2012). By international comparison, East 
ECE countries tend to have relatively inactive welfare states that are, in addition, comparatively heavily 
biased towards elderly citizens (Vanhuysse, 2013). Today, legacies from earlier post-communist policies 
and practices such as inadequate health-care practices, internationally very low labour market 
participation rates among women and older workers (Cerami and Vanhuysse, 2009) and historically 
unprecedented “great abnormal pensioner booms” (early and disability retirement) (Vanhuysse, 2004) 
have prepared East ECE countries badly for the coming three decades, when their societies will enter a 
period of particularly fast demographic aging. Aging populations have both demographic and policy 
aspects. The demographic aspect is described in Part 1 under Hot Question 1. This discussion emphasized 
that people will not only live longer but they will live longer in better health. Despite this important 
qualification, the absolute number of older persons will grow, including those who will need care and 
assistance. The social security schemes should reflect these demographic changes and undergo reforms 
that will allow them to remain sustainable. A number of countries in the ECE region have taken steps to 
reform their social security and welfare systems accordingly. Most commonly, the reforms concentrated 
on the pension systems. In general, pension schemes are financed by obligatory contributions of both 
employers and employees. This can be complemented by social pension schemes. Often mandatory, 
pension insurance system exists alongside voluntary options. Currently most of the pension systems in 
Europe are heavily dependent on "pay-as-you-go" systems in which the current economically active pay 
into the social security system for the pensions of the currently retired. This system is based on the 
expectation that also in the future the economically active will be able to cover pension needs of the 
cohorts that are retiring. This system may be less sustainable given the effects of population ageing.  
To assure sustainability of the pension systems important reforms must be adopted. The minimal reform 
requirements are an increase in contributory periods, limiting early retirement options, and increasing the 
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retirement age. However, these reforms face implementation challenges. They are politically sensitive, 
unpopular among many, and often not well communicated to the public.  
The OECD Pension Outlook 2012 states that "It may not feel like it, but today’s retirees are living 
through what might prove to have been a golden age for pensions and pensioners. Far fewer older people 
live in poverty than in the past: about a quarter fewer than in the mid-1980s. They also can expect to live 
longer. Today’s and tomorrow’s workers, in contrast, will have to work longer before retiring and have 
smaller public pensions. Their private pensions are much more likely to be of the defined-contribution 
type, meaning that individuals are more directly exposed to investment risk and themselves bear the 
pension cost of living longer." (OECD, 2012). 
The governments of the ECE countries must not only try to reform their pension systems but are also 
committed to tackle other ageing-related issues. The 2012 Vienna Ministerial Declaration stated under the 
general motto "Ensuring a Society for All Ages: Promoting quality of life and active ageing" (UNECE, 
2012) a commitment to promote and support: 
- Longer working life and maintenance of the ability to work 
- Participation, non-discrimination and social inclusion of older persons 
- Dignity, health and independence in older age 
- Maintenance of intergenerational solidarity 
Active ageing promotion and support is crucial for the future sustainability of social welfare systems and 
the economic prosperity of individuals and the whole society. Longer working life as a part of active 
ageing is, however, a challenge. Meeting the challenge depends not only on commitment and activity of 
governments but also on the efforts of employers to keep older workers in employment and the will of 
employees to work longer than the previous cohorts. The general understanding of the adequacy of 
current retirement ages is based on a number of myths "that are highly questionable in light of scientific 
evidence from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (Share)19" (Börsch-Supan et al., 
2012). The authors highlight in particular the following: 
Myth 1: Older people cannot work because they are unhealthy. Health is not a primary cause of 
retirement in Europe. Older people aged 60-69 perceive themselves as relatively healthy (about 80 per 
cent aged between 60 to 69 years) and more than 60 per cent of them have no functional limitations. The 
authors suggest that a flexible retirement age would be much more effective in dealing with these 
differences than a fixed age: people with health problems need to retire earlier whereas most people could 
easily work longer.  
Myth 2: Older people should not work because they are much less efficient than younger workers. 
Research in manufacturing industry shows that older workers tend more often to make small mistakes but 
that younger workers tend to make less larger and more costly mistakes (Börsch-Supan et al., 2008). 
Older workers show high productivity in the work that they know and are experienced in, although they 
accommodate less readily to a new job. Other research on the productivity of older workers has not 
                                                           
19
 The survey includes 19 EU countries and Israel. More information on the survey on http://www.share-project.org/home0.html .  
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produced much evidence that older workers’ productivity would be either lower or higher than of younger 
workers. Altogether, these studies imply that it is advisable to keep experienced workers in their current 
workplaces instead of forcing them to look for new jobs (Börsch-Supan et al., 2008). 
Myth 3: Life after retirement is blissful. Life satisfaction after early retirement decreases faster than after 
retirement at a later age (Börsch-Supan and Jürges, 2006). Later retirement is also shown to have positive 
effects on cognitive abilities and their retention.  
Myth 4: Active ageing harms the young. This argument does not hold. If it did, countries with early 
retirements should have a lower unemployment rate of the young. This is not the case. One of the reasons 
is that early retirement is expensive and a serious burden on the economy (Börsch-Supan et al., 2012).  
Myth 5: Population ageing is a tsunami and its consequences are our demographic destiny.  Demography 
can foresee quite accurately the numbers and proportion of elderly to come and can predict quite well 
their probable health status and mortality conditions under generally holding conditions. This is why 
national governments are able to prepare themselves for demographic ageing. Demography is not destiny 
because policies can mitigate much of the undesirable social and economic effect of ageing and prevent 
its negative impact on the social welfare systems (Vanhuysse, 2013).  
Successful active ageing policies combine many features and incentives from different policy areas. The 
active ageing policies in Sweden are a useful example. They combine changes in the social welfare 
systems (pension system, social insurance), tax incentives for employers and older aged employees, 
lifelong learning, active labour market policy, promotion of healthy working conditions, and policies that 
combat age discrimination on the labour market.  
Sweden began its reforms of pensions and benefits for older workers about two decades ago in mid-1990 
when it became very clear that the current “pay as you go” system was unsustainable in the current and 
prospective demographic development. The adjustment of the system is continuous. The idea behind the 
reforms was that both employees and employers need incentives to be willing to stay in employment 
longer and employ older workers. The current Swedish pension system is progressive, allowing retiring 
and claiming pension benefits from the age of 61 while still being employed. Alternative exit routes to 
retirement have been limited such that today early retirement can be granted only for medical reasons. It 
is only granted on a temporal basis, and work incapacity status is evaluated later on a regular basis by the 
Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Anxo, 2012). 
Swedish tax incentives for older workers’ employment include a higher in-work tax credit for people who 
have turned 65. Special employer contributions to workers' wages and the tax income for those over 65 
were abolished, so that employers now have to pay only 10.2 per cent of the wage cost instead of the 
standard pay-roll tax of 31 per cent. This makes older workers cheaper and represents, in fact, implicit 
subsidies for older workers´ employment. The age-wage profile in Sweden is relatively flat by 
international standards with a relatively low seniority wage premium. This not only makes older workers 
cheaper but also facilitates their further education financed by employers. Increased productivity of the 
worker after training does not increase the wage rate proportionally (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999).  
Lifelong learning is an integral part of the Swedish educational and employment system. The system 
allows employees to return to education after temporal interruption, or to take a special training course 
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along with employment. Lifelong learning can be acquired through formal education (the regular school 
system), or through training provided by employers, municipalities or on an individual basis. The 
Swedish adult population scores among the highest on lifelong learning in the ECE Region: in 2006 73 
per cent of the population aged 25-64 participated in some form of education or training. Although 
participation declines slightly with age, it remains still quite high (65 per cent for those aged 55-64 years 
(data from Anxo, 2012). About half of the lifelong education or training is provided by employers. This 
high participation in adult training is related to the existence of powerful social partners and well-
developed social dialogue.  
In case of unemployment, Sweden has a wide range of active labour market policies, such as training, job 
search support and recruitment subsidies. None of them is particularly targeted to older workers, but some 
have special conditions for the unemployed aged 56 and over. One of these tools, "New Start Job," 
provides support for the employers that employ a long-term unemployed person.  For job seekers over 55, 
long-term unemployment is defined when lasting for a period of 6 months and longer, instead of 12 
month for younger job seekers. The support is accomplished via subtraction from the employer's payroll 
tax of the wage he gives to the unemployed job-seeker. For those over 55 this subsidy can be attributed 
for twice the time allowed for the subsidies for younger workers. Research has shown that measures close 
to the regular labour market are on average more successful to tackle unemployment than other 
programmes (Forslund et al., 2004). The wage subsidies targeted to senior workers in long-term 
unemployment may well contribute to reducing early exit of the labour force (Lindqvist, 2007). 
 
Hot Question 2: Is Migration a threat or Opportunity for Development? 
Migration is different. Answers to the other three Hot Questions are based on choices, constrained as they 
are, that all societies in the ECE region have made. No country would have the increased longevity that 
arises from better health and living standards go the other way, and no affected country would have the 
hardships brought on by the collapse of the USSR or the recent global recession continue. Likewise, each 
wants women and couples to be able to have the numbers of children they want, although some would 
like this desired number to be higher. And each country appears through its policies to desire less 
inequality among its people. 
But migration is different. Depending on the time and circumstance, and indeed on who is giving an 
opinion and what kind of migrant is considered, more migrants entering the country is desirable or not. It 
is the same for migrants leaving the country. And what is deemed good in the country on one end of the 
flow may be, and often is, deemed bad in the country on the other end.  
Policies to deal with migration, that is, to encourage or discourage it and then to turn its consequences to 
advantage rather than harm, are as complicated as the motivations behind them. In receiving countries, the 
concerns span diverse policy areas: settlement patterns, ethnicity mixing, job availability, tax-paid 
economic benefits, impact on upward social mobility, crime, and voting behaviour. Similarly diverse are 
the opportunities: employment in “undesirable” jobs, trained and innovative minds, the vigor of 
population variety, and supplementing small segments of the native-born age structure. In sending 
countries, the concerns and possible opportunities are equally diverse. Where unemployment is high, out-
migration can relieve it. Where household income is low, remittances can raise it. Confronted with the 
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diversity of policy areas that affect these concerns and opportunities, this section can only suggest the 
principles involved in useful policy and highlight some best practices to implement these principles.   
The United States, because almost its entire population is immigrants or descended from immigrants, is 
an obvious place to start our brief survey of policies. In spite of relatively restrictive immigration policies 
and practices, nearly one in five inhabitants is either him/herself an immigrant or the child of at least one 
immigrant. In most recent years, the U.S. accepted more legal immigrants as permanent residents than all 
other countries in the world combined. As guided by current legislation, family unification accounts for 
approximately two-thirds of legal immigration to the US. The number of foreign nationals who became 
legal permanent residents of the U.S. in recent years as a result of family reunification far exceeded those 
who were accepted on the basis of employment skills and for humanitarian reasons.   
Once arrived, legal immigrants are helped (or hindered) more by state and local laws and practices than 
national ones. As a rule, they find their way into schools, communities, and jobs without much more 
difficulty than others. While residential segregation is common, particularly in the first generation, it is 
usually voluntary and only rarely accompanied by generalized dispute and violence (Tichenor, 2002).   
From the fact that the U.S. labour market and social fabric have relatively painlessly absorbed an 
extraordinary proportion of immigrants in the last half century, one might look to American policy and 
practice as examples. Unfortunately, the look would be long and ultimately unrewarding. Whether the apt 
metaphor is “melting pot” in which all come to look alike or “salad bowl” in which each maintains his 
own flavour to make a savoury combination, the country’s geographically diverse practices along with the 
long tradition of ethnic and language mixing make this case sui generis. 
Illegal immigration into the U.S. is a perennial and much more contentious issue. Estimates of the number 
of illegal immigrants range from 11 to 20 million. Their legal, social, and economic situation is often 
precarious, but not so much as to reduce pent-up demand to enter. Only the recent severe recession in the 
U.S. job market has lessened this demand in recent years.20 
Let us turn instead to Sweden, whose policies toward immigrants are frequently looked to as enlightened 
and successful. Swedish immigration policies are based on the principles of multiculturalism and 
diversity, under which the number of immigrants has risen steadily for 25 years. The government has for 
decades offered language classes and other programs to facilitate labour market success. Residency and 
citizenship are relatively easily achieved, certainly compared to the U.S., for example, and the country 
welcomes dual nationality. Liberal family reunification regulations are in effect. Yet, a recent study 
(Wiesbrock, 2011) found that immigrants are two times more likely to be unemployed than native-born 
persons. By this criterion, Sweden is an average EU country, many of which provide far less assistance. 
One cannot know the counterfactual, what immigrants’ job experience would be without such welcoming 
policies, but this outcome, even apart from examination of other measures of success, strongly suggest 
that the integration of immigrants is not easily achieved.   
At the other end of the process, few studies have explored the effects of policies designed to control 
emigration from a sending country (Kureková, 2011). Most emigration policies that encourage or restrict 
emigration aim to control the migration of specific groups of individuals based on gender, skill level, 
                                                           
20
 For a general treatment of unwanted migration, legal or illegal, see Thielemann (2005) 
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education, or ethnic affiliation (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011). The effects of such policies on migration 
flows seem to be unknown, likely due to the low quality of emigration data, the relatively infrequent 
emigration policymaking compared to immigration, and the fact that the right to leave one’s country is 
internationally recognized. This last cause is at the heart of the difficulty for countries, such as some in 
the East European and Central Asia sub-regions, whose national interests, if not the interests of out-
migrants, would likely be served by discouraging emigration, even considering the benefits of 
remittances. There is little in the realm of explicit migration policy that they can do. Instead, they must 
see to policies that improve employment and living conditions at home, a challenge made harder as 
skilled and ambitious young persons leave. Or they must try to fill in behind the leavers by embodying in 
the stayers the same education and training that departed with the leavers. Philippine investments in 
nursing training is an instance of such a policy.   
Governments in sending countries can also ensure by law and regulation that remittances sent home arrive 
at their destination, and they might, although successful examples are lacking, redirect some proportion of 
remittances to projects that benefit the society more broadly than just the networked recipients. After all, 
foreign remittances exceed the sum of foreign direct investment and foreign aid that crosses all 
international borders. And they continue to grow at the global level. In total, some 250 million migrants 
are forecast at a recent IFAD conference (http://www.ifad.org/pub/index.htm) to send home $500 billion 
in 2013, an increase in remittances of almost 20 per cent from the previous year. 
In all these efforts of sending and receiving countries, perhaps the most encouraging signpost for policy is 
research findings gathered by the Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI), a program of the 
UNDP in collaboration with five other UN agencies: IOM, ILO, UNHCR, UNFPA, and UN Women 
(2013). This evidence-based effort seeks to “effectively harness the potential of migration for 
development”. They find that “the most successful and sustainable M&D interventions are those with 
strong anchorage with the local governments in countries of origin and destination, in line with the 
essential local-to-local dimension of the M&D nexus. When local authorities share a common vision with 
civil society partners, they develop a sense of ownership over projects that lead them to commit time, 
energy and resources, which effectively contribute to the success and sustainability of an M&D initiative. 
For these reasons, the drivers and impact of migration are often most strongly felt at the local level, be it 
in terms of effects on the local labour market, the size and demographic of the local population, or the 
need for public service provision. This is why provinces and local authorities are strategic levels of 
governments to be involved.” 
Carrying these and other experiences into the future, two recent papers (Åkerman Börje, 2013; Knoll and 
Keijzer, 2013) examine perspectives and priorities for how migration policies could contribute more 
positively to development policy. Part 3 of this Report suggests even more broadly that explicit migration 
policies and others that indirectly affect migration must now be viewed in the context of investment in 
human capital that take place in populations that are no longer growing, the two cross-cutting themes of 
this Report.  
Hot Question 3: Is fertility in the ECE Region too low? 
We analysed levels of fertility in the ECE Region and discussed the reasons for such levels and their 
trends in Part 1. Here we concentrate on the policy tools that may influence these fertility levels. It is 
useful first to reflect briefly on who would like to influence fertility levels and why. At the level of 
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individuals, couples wish to have children or not and a certain number. Appropriate policies can help 
them to achieve their fertility desires. At the aggregate level, policymakers and politicians may set a 
desired fertility level for the country because they think it would benefit the economy and foster 
prosperity. The aggregate desired fertility that averages many couples’ desires may or may not be in line 
with officials’ idea of desired aggregate fertility. There is no reason why they should be the same. 
 Experience strongly suggests that policy intentions that go against individual desires, for example by 
setting a numerical goal, are very likely to fail in the long run and can, at the most, change fertility levels 
only temporally by shifting couples’ timing of births (for example, the pronatalist policies in the former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe before 1989). Policy attempts are therefore best 
oriented towards creating conditions that make it easier for couples to have their desired number of 
children. Here we will focus on such policies and strategies that may facilitate couples having their 
desired number of children while promoting the reconciliation of work and family life.   
Since the 1960s, labour force participation of women has been increasing in all countries of the ECE 
Region. Most women in ECE countries do not picture themselves primarily as housewives but want to 
participate in the labour market, both as a part of their self-realisation and to (help) support the family. 
Given the changing family compositions and structures, many women, particularly if single or divorced, 
are the only breadwinners in the family.  At the same time, in all the ECE countries women are still the 
prime care-givers for their children. It can be difficult in these circumstances for women to harmonise 
work and family duties. 
 
Evidence regarding the impact of family policies on fertility is rather inconclusive (Gauthier, 2007). 
There is some evidence that a wider set of policies enabling women and men to combine work with 
family life encourages fertility, but the patterns are not completely consistent (for a literature review see 
Gauthier, 2007; and Thévenon, 2011). Family policies do not function in isolation from other policies, 
and from culture and the economic situation.  It is therefore very difficult to measure their effects. 
However, research on the impact of family policies across Europe finds some indications that family 
policies, fertility, and women’s labour-force participation are interrelated (Neyer, 2005). In most ECE 
countries, the state through its policies largely determines the availability of services for the distribution 
of care between public sector and private sector, and between men and women.  
 
Family policies may be designed with different aims and they may also differ in their effects. The aims of 
family policies can be usefully categorized as follows (following Thévenon, 2011): 
 
- Dual-earner family model. These policies encourage women's employment and reconciliation of work 
and childcare. They aim to secure women's continuing employment, including support for flexible 
working hours, and to provide benefits that compensate for income loss during parental leave. These 
policies include parental leave, formal day care for young children, and tax systems that contain 
incentives to work. A rationale for these policies is that higher employment participation contributes to 
the economic and financial stability of the state.  
- Improving gender equity. These policies aim at a balanced share of paid and unpaid work between the 
partners, including childcare. This objective can be promoted by childcare related leave for both parents 
with a special emphasis on father's leave that would be lost if not taken, or by "fractionable" parental 
leave.  
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- Direct compensation for the economic cost of children. These policies include cash benefits and fiscal 
transfers. They aim to narrow the gap in earnings between families with children and the childless. The 
cash benefits are usually directed at nuclear families. In general, they may encourage a relatively 
traditional division of domestic labour, since they are most likely used by the mother (Crompton ed, 
1999; Lappegård, 2009).  
- Poverty reduction and income maintenance. These policies focus on the allocation of special benefits to 
low income families with children and may include housing benefits.  
- Support for early childhood development. Many countries design family policies based on this objective. 
The notion of what is beneficial for children may differ across countries. It usually includes quality 
formal preschool education and parental care. Norms about the appropriate age for entry to formal 
education vary greatly across the ECE countries. 
- Raising birth rates. Low fertility is a concern in many ECE countries. However in only a few are family 
policies designed with the explicit aim of raising fertility.  
 
ECE countries differ in the aims, design and outcomes of their family policies (Figure 2.1). 
Nordic countries are characterised by generous family support that allows and motivates women with 
small children to participate fully in the labour market by providing generous compensation for lost 
income during full-time childcare, and providing state-subsidized and therefore affordable care for young 
children. Family policies in Nordic countries were designed to allow for gender equity at both work and 
childcare. They are often described as the most advanced with respect to gender equality.  
 
These Nordic policies allow families relatively wide flexibility in organising their work and childcare 
tasks. Total investment in childcare and education services for children below age six is costly in Nordic 
countries, representing about 1.5 percent of GDP, compared to an average of 0.5 percent in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, and 0.7 % in Southern Europe (Thévenon 2011). This high cost is reflected in high payroll 
taxes. Overall, the Nordic countries have high women’s participation in the labour force, relatively high 
fertility, and high proportions of children aged 0-3 years in formal childcare (more than 70 per cent in 
Denmark, 44 per cent in Sweden, and 35 per cent in Norway, Thévenon 2011). 
The Anglo-Saxon countries have in many respects an opposite support system for families than the 
Nordic countries, but they also achieve high rates of female employment and relatively high fertility. 
Their systems provide much less public investment in parental leave and early child care. Accordingly, it 
is much more expensive in direct costs for parents to have a child and provide care. Some balance is 
achieved by generally wide availability of part-time work for mothers with small children, by relatively 
flexible labour markets that allow easier re-entry, and through tax-breaks for families. Cash benefits are 
mostly reserved for families in need to protect them from poverty. In United States, for example, there is 
no state-subsidized maternity leave. Women are entitled to three months of unpaid leave, and further 
benefits are state- or corporate-dependent.  
Southern European countries are also characterized by less extensive provision of child care services. 
There is no state support consistent with the dual earner family model, and much care for young children 
relies on family members. Women’s labour force participation is low, as well as fertility.  
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Figure 2.1: OECD countries by type of family policies 
 
Note 1: The position of the countries gauged by first two principal components derived from the principal component analysis.  
Note 2:  Axis 1 relate to the support to parent of children under the age of 3 to enable them to combine work and childcare. Countries clustered on the left have relatively high 
support for families with very young children. Those clustered to the right have most of the spending orient towards middle and late childhood. 
  Axis 2 relate to the "generosity" of leave entitlements. Scoring high on the Y axis means long leave entitlements.  
Source: Figure reproduced from Thévenon (2011) 
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Eastern European countries are in many respects similar to Southern Europe. In general they have longer 
parental leave, but the benefits are very low as are all other monetary or tax compensations for families 
(with the exception of Hungary). Their systems do not support early return of women into work and are 
characterised by fragmented policies. As an example, in the Czech Republic women can return to work 
after six months of maternity leave but cannot benefit from any state subsidies for formal childcare. There 
is virtually no public childcare for children under the age of three and private care is expensive. Most 
Czech women stay at home to take care of their children until the age of three. They can engage in 
economic activity at the same time, but only very few part-time jobs are available.  
This overview illustrates that family policies across ECE countries are very diverse. In general, the 
countries with higher fertility levels have higher labour force participation of women with young children 
and relatively short parental leaves.  
 
Hot Question 4: Are ECE Countries Becoming Less Equal Societies? 
History suggests that the natural tendency of human societies as they become richer, and even when they 
simply move sideways over time, is toward inequality. With few exceptions, communal action is required, 
usually by governments, to thwart this tendency. History also suggests that such action, to be successful, 
must be multifaceted and continual. Even then, the results are never consistent and complete, as the brief 
overview in Part 1 suggests. Indeed, the principal conclusion of the World Development Report (2006) 
still holds: “Inequality of opportunity, both within and among nations, sustains extreme deprivation, 
results in wasted human potential and often weakens prospects for overall prosperity and economic 
growth.” 
This section briefly reviews the tools contemporary governments of the ECE countries employ to reduce 
inequality, first general inequality of income and wealth, then inequality more broadly in the dimensions 
of generations, gender, and ethnicity. We pay particular attention to several countries whose policies work 
well and several others where progress is slow. 
Governments seek to influence the distribution of income and wealth most generally through their tax and 
transfer systems, with progressive tax rates on the revenue side and a great variety of redistributive 
policies on the expenditure side. Except at the extremes of tax progressivity, taxes have a weaker 
influence on inequality than do transfers. This is at least partially due to the tighter focus of transfer 
programs on target populations; taxes are a much blunter tool. However, the distribution of incomes is in 
fact quite insensitive to both taxes and transfers within the central range of country experiences. To the 
extent that transfers consist of goods and services that improve well-being without directly increasing 
measured income—for example, medical care, food supplementation, and job training—such transfers 
can measurably reduce the inequality of well-being more than is reflected in income statistics.21 
All countries in the ECE region have progressive income tax schedules on paper and most in actual effect, 
although the progressivity in effect is usually if not always less than in the spirit of the law. Indeed, the 
                                                           
21
 OECD (2008) reviews the relevant data for these countries and examines how the various government tax-benefit systems affect these trends.  
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perceived failure of some national tax systems to collect due taxes from wealthy individuals is near the 
heart of the current controversy within the EU over the responsibility of some member countries to 
contribute to the economic recovery of others, in the wake of the great recession. 
Accordingly, bringing tax compliance into line with tax law, where the gap is large, can be considered a 
fundamental policy step toward reducing inequality. Whether such tax reform ends up benefiting persons 
at the low end of the distribution of well-being and thereby reducing poverty depends on transfer policy, 
which is quite a different matter. Reducing inequality is not necessarily the same as reducing poverty. 
There are many other worthwhile ways of spending tax revenue. 
Intergenerational equity 
We now turn to consideration of policies targeted at increasing the well-being of particular 
subpopulations often considered at particular risk, beginning with intergenerational equity, particularly 
that of children and the elderly or, as it sometimes emerges, children versus the elderly. Vanhuysse (2013) 
surveys patterns of “intergenerational justice” in twenty-nine OECD countries, focusing particularly on 
the extent to which current socioeconomic policies reflect a bias toward today’s older or younger 
generations. His analysis takes account of different and changing age structures across the countries as 
well as implications for future generations, resulting in a comprehensive intergenerational justice index 
that accounts for economic-fiscal, social and environmental aspects of policies and outcomes. 
Estonia has the highest overall index rating, followed closely by Israel, Hungary and the North European 
states of Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Germany ranks in the middle, with Canada, Greece, 
Italy and the U.S. at the bottom. Estonia performs particularly strongly in the economic-fiscal dimension 
at the young end of the intergenerational scale, with the lowest level of public debt per child. A child in 
Estonia current bears only $6,400 in public debt compared with Germany at $267,000, Greece at 
$299,000, Italy at $308,000. In contrast, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic feature per-child debt 
levels of $50,000 to $65,000 (Vanhuysse, 2013, p. 22). This debt measure will play out as currently 
young cohorts age. While they are young, though, poverty matters more. The North European states rank 
best in this dimension, along with Slovenia, with child poverty rates of 3.7 to 7.0 per cent. Worst are 
Israel, the Southern European states and particularly the U.S. at 21 per cent. In most countries studied, the 
child poverty rate is higher than that of the elderly. 
In the search for policy causes of these intergenerational differences, social spending by target age group 
is an obvious candidate. Every country in the study allocates more social spending to older rather than 
younger persons. Poland, Greece, Italy and Slovakia allocate an unusually large share of such expenditure 
to the elderly, with Poland at an 8.6 ratio. In contrast, Ireland, Belgium and Estonia allocate relatively the 
most to children and young people, although still less than to older persons. Among the “oldest” 
countries, Italy shows a strong tilt toward older persons, Germany is in the middle, and Sweden allocates 
more evenly across the generations, although still favouring the elderly (Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2010; 
Vanhuysse, 2013).   
This relationship between age structure and social spending patterns is suggestive but not at all consistent.  
Not all older societies have relatively high social spending on the elderly. The relationship is strengthened 
considerably by adding racial/ethnic composition of a population to the analysis. Mather (2007) and 
Alesina et al (1999) show that for the case of the U.S., the states with the highest racial/ethnic differences 
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between older people and children spent the lowest shares of gross state product on public education, 
while states with the least such fragmentation spent the highest shares. The same holds true across a 
sample of American communities. The differences are substantial. More broadly, Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) show that racial/ethnic divisions may explain up to half of the gap in social spending on children 
between Europe as a whole and the U.S.  
Partly because of the younger age structure of U.S. immigrants and their generally higher fertility, 
minority children have accounted for more than 98 per cent of growth in the American child population 
over the last two decades. By now, minority children constitute about one-half of the population of 
children under age five. Countries of the ECE region that will experience increasing immigration might 
anticipate pressures similar to those in the U.S. to constrain expenditures on children who are ethnically 
different from those paying the supporting taxes.   
Particularly in Eastern Europe, the prevalence of out-of-pocket payments and, reportedly, frequent 
requests by health care providers for informal payments are significant barriers to accessing health care 
services. The consequences fall disproportionally on women and young children through deficits in 
sexual, reproductive, and maternal health care (Colombini et al., 2011; Newport, 2009). Relatedly, the 
Roma populations of Europe have long suffered explicit or informal racial discrimination in employment, 
housing, financial protection, and health care, a problem that persists when Roma people move among 
countries. 
Program efficiency in delivering money and services to target populations will become increasingly 
important as immigrant populations increase and as chronically underserved populations, like the Roma, 
spread more evenly across the EU countries under a regime of open migration. Among the policy 
measures that have been shown to benefit children, such as child tax credits, nutrition interventions, and 
generous family allowances and parental leave policies, the research is clear that early childhood 
education and care programs are the most effective (Esping-Andersen, 2008; Heckman, 2006; Vanhuysse, 
2008) Such investments not only benefit children as children, but have been shown to improve 
employment rates, monthly earnings, welfare receipt status, and crime rates, all later as adults. Along the 
way, early learning makes later learning easier and more effective. 
But how to insure that investments in children persist and even increase in an era of diminished resources 
and demographic counter-pressures? In an idea once novel but now increasingly discussed, Demeny 
(1986) proposed giving each parent one-half extra vote (or equivalently each mother one full extra vote) 
to be cast on behalf of each child younger than voting age. In so acting as trustees for their children, 
parents would be upholding the democratic one-person, one-vote principle.  In Vanhuysse‘s (2013, p. 42) 
words, this policy “would add a degree of hard power to the intergenerational politics game because, once 
enacted, it would change governments’ electoral incentives in favour of younger generations.” The degree 
of change would likely be significant but not numerically overwhelming (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2007). 
To our knowledge, no country has yet implemented such a policy, which would in many countries require 
a constitutional change. 
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Gender 
More than intergenerational inequality, gender inequality has long proven a particularly difficult 
challenge in the ECE countries and, indeed, across the globe. In recent decades, women’s lives around the 
world have improved dramatically (World Bank, 2012), but gaps remain in many respects and all places. 
Although, as Part 1 documented, women still fare less well than men across various dimensions (with the 
notable exception of longevity) and in every country, the discrepancies are larger and with more severe 
consequences in Eastern Europe and Central Asia than in the other countries of the ECE region. We 
concentrate here on these countries and on policy initiatives that make a difference in their settings (this 
discussion is largely based on Colombini et al., 2011; and Newport, 2009). 
Alongside less control of monetary resources and less decision making power in the family and 
community, the lack of programmatic and fiscal emphasis on aspects of life that affect principally women 
is an enormous hindrance to their equal participation in these countries’ wellbeing.  What to do about this 
is no mystery. Both the experience of other countries in the ECE region and program evaluation research 
globally point to the interventions that make the most difference. Cultural differences across nations make 
remarkably little difference in these priorities. Legal, geographical and financial access to sexual, 
reproductive and maternal health care heads the list. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, broadening 
health insurance coverage is key. Improved access to family planning makes a difference in these 
countries as well, including removing costs for the poorest populations. General education about women’s 
existing rights to services and in the face of abuse, such as these rights are, is also shown to make a 
difference.   
As these investments and improvements occur in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the lack of treatment 
protocols and of data and analysis for targeting and evaluation will be growing issues, unless they 
improve apace. Not all countries have standardized administrative data systems that usefully describe 
inputs, processes, and outcomes. Evidence largely from elsewhere demonstrates that prescribed 
investments and interventions work, but without the data to document it in-country, political support can 
wane. On the basis of evidence, that also can be anticipated. 
Gender-based violence remains another challenge in in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The effective 
policy and program measures to meet this challenge appear more culturally dependent than in the case of 
health care, as the sources of such violence often lie in deeply rooted social norms and practices that may 
even encourage it, much less tolerate it. Nevertheless, basic principles seem universal (UNFPA, 2009): 
Young men, partners and husbands must be involved. So must male-dominated institutions such as the 
police and military. Commitments from influential officials in local and national government institutions 
must be obtained. Participation among apathetic groups must be encouraged. And action, not just 
knowledge, must be the goal. 
Finally, women’s rights in the areas discussed here are under-enumerated and under-protected in most of 
these countries.  Even de jure, constitutions and legislation do not everywhere conform to international 
norms. Such provisions as equal protection and anti-discrimination clauses, equal retirement ages, sexual 
harassment laws, minimum legal ages of marriage, and stand-alone gender inequality laws are missing in 
various combinations. Where such de jure provisions exist, effective implementation is spotty, including 
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establishment of effective monitoring systems. Indeed, UNFPA (2009) concludes that “The overarching 
theme running through all the domestic country profiles is the inadequate implementation of laws.”   
Education 
The ubiquitous roles of education in nations’ economies, polities and societies are well established in 
research. Increasingly, the questions about causality and selectivity that have long bedevilled firm 
scientific conclusions and strong policy responses are usefully if not completely dispelled (Lutz and KC, 
2011). Indeed, of the policy interventions that can improve the lives of children, now and later as adults, 
early childhood investment in education and care heads the list (Esping-Andersen, 2008; Heckman, 2006; 
Vanhuysse, 2008). Through improved secondary school graduation rates, employment rates, monthly 
earnings, welfare receipt status, and crime rates, these investments pay off well into the future. Indeed, 
geographically widespread evidence now indicates that more highly skilled people adapt more quickly 
and usefully to environmental insults and climate change (Butz and Sendzimir, 2013). Even the tendency 
toward democratization appears causally related to the education level of the citizenry (Lutz and KC, 
2011). 
In spite of the more recent evidence for decreasing income inequality in ECE countries since 2000, a 
longer term trend has held sway across the industrialized world since at least the early 1980s. A leading 
explanation points to the rapid development of sophisticated technologies in the workplace, technologies 
whose appropriate use requires the knowledge and capabilities that higher levels of education impart. 
According to this evidence, these ever more sophisticated technologies drive an employment and earnings 
wedge between the workers who can flourish with them and those that cannot. Hence, the overall 
distribution of earnings and income becomes less equal (Goldin and Katz, 2008).   
Manyika et. al. (2013) and Brynjolfsson et al (2011) argue that innovations in machine learning, voice 
recognition and nanotechnology, in particular are now rapidly progressing in such a way as to 
disadvantage even the “knowledge workers” who have mainly benefitted from the information revolution 
up to now. Instead, “much of the forthcoming gains from future technological change may accrue 
increasingly to the investors who bankroll these risky endeavours, the innovators who produce them, and 
the consumers who use the cheaper and better products,” leaving the former beneficiaries of a computer-
equipped workplace out in the cold, along with their less educated contemporaries.   
Whether the future of the modern workplace follows the historical path of the last 30 years or an even 
more accelerated one, the effects will not be confined to the more industrialized countries of the ECE 
region. As the rewards to education and initiative climb, selective migration of those most likely to 
benefit can be expected to increase alongside, exacerbating the costs of emigration from countries whose 
industries do not keep up and from regions of those countries that fall particularly behind.   
The Recent Recession 
In the extensive research literature about the effects of economic recessions on the distribution of income, 
the recent “great recession,” beginning in 2008, will likely be the most productive of useful knowledge.  
This recession has been hard and long, globally widespread, and accompanied by the best data by far for 
studying its effects, prominently including panel survey data that have documented the adjustments and 
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consequences for individual persons and households in many world regions and countries. Because of the 
recession’s tattered and uneven recovery, more years are required for a full picture. Still, some things are 
known. 
Jenkins et al (2013) examine the early cross-national evidence regarding income levels, poverty rates, and 
income inequality, focusing particularly on case-study evidence for Germany, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, the 
UK, and the U.S. Between 2007 and 2009, government support through tax and benefit systems provided 
a cushion against the downturn, and household income distributions did not change much. But after 2009, 
much greater change in incomes is likely as a result of fiscal measures to address the structural deficits 
revealed by the recession. The book's main policy lesson is that stabilisation of the household income 
distribution in the face of macroeconomic turbulence is an achievable policy goal. Most recently, 
Population Europe (2013) has convened a forum of economic and policy experts to discuss “Recession 
and Social Vulnerability in Europe: Insights from Demography.” A report is forthcoming.22   
Recessions are a natural feature of market-oriented economic systems and so will continue. Although we 
can hope that future recessions will be average and not “great,” the knowledge gained from this one, 
particularly in the policy arena, promises to surpass what was previously known and to be applicable 
across the wide range of countries in the ECE region. It seems likely that every policy or program 
effective in reducing inequality of income and broader wellbeing in normal and good times will also 
prove effective in dulling the effects of recessions on the most vulnerable in bad times. Where such 
complementarities and absence of tradeoffs arise in the policy arena, governments are well advised to take 
advantage of them. 
 
Conclusions 
Best practices, whether in policy or any other field of human endeavor, must come along with stated 
conditions under which they are possible and under which they stand a good chance of being effective. 
Principles may be applicable everywhere, but the best ways to put them into action are not. 
Within the ECE Region with its enormous diversity of most everything that matters in determining what 
policies are possible and which are effective, as well as its equally great diversity of starting positions, 
nearly every best practice has conditions.  We have tried to make these conditions and their implied 
ranges of applicability evident in the preceding analysis.  In concluding this report, we present in Part 3 a 
less subtle but hopefully more arresting treatment of best practices:  an unadorned bulleted list of policy 
recommendations. 
 
  
                                                           
22
 In the meantime, see the video stream of the conference: 
https://scic.ec.europa.eu/streaming/index.php?es=2&sessionno=f3a3a63a79eb1831b0a2776bfd20d838    
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Part 3: Policy Gaps and Possibilities 
 
The ECE region, as the world at large, is in the late-middle stages of a fundamental transformation from 
population growth to population ageing. Accompanying this transformation is another fundamental global 
shift: from the importance of population numbers to population quality. A third transformation—far 
advanced in some industrialized countries, well underway in many developing countries, and surely on 
the horizon in the rest—is taking place in the structure and functions of families. Meanwhile, migration 
continues to slowly transform where people live on the globe—in which countries and whether urban or 
rural. 
The first of these transformations, population ageing, is new to the Earth, less than half a century old but 
now widely recognized and worried over even where it is just beginning, and more so in the ECE region 
where it is well underway. The second transformation, the emergence of population quality, or human 
capital, as a more fundamental driver of nations’ success or failure than population quantity is yet 
relatively little recognized, and more in research than in public perception and policy. The third of these 
transformations—from multi-generational households through nuclear families and on to the variety of 
ways people in the industrialized countries are now living together, or apart—is everywhere underway in 
the ECE Region, although at different stages in different places. The fourth transformation, through 
migration, has been underway for millennia, tracked in public perception if not in data, and forced, 
encouraged, discouraged or prohibited by governments.  
Of these four, it is the second, the emergence of human capital in the form principally of education and 
health, that governments can most readily influence. In a stoke of global good fortune, this is also the 
transformation that, if it accelerates, can mitigate many of the anticipated undesirable effects of the other 
three, even turning them into gains for humankind. Although yet little recognized, this may well be the 
yardstick by which historians of the future will measure the success of countries and their governments in 
our time. 
Accordingly, we now build on the analyses in Parts 1 and 2 to identify the principal gaps between, on the 
one hand, the direction current trends in outcome indicators are leading countries in the ECE region and, 
on the other hand, the policy measures necessary to alter these trends in favorable directions. 
Corresponding to the four Hot Questions that are oriented to the present and recent past, we now 
introduce four forward-looking Hot Issues for policy. For each Hot Issue, best practices within the Region 
provide possible ways forward. However, countries at different levels of development with different 
cultures and institutions can face very different constraints. One size does not fit all. Hence, some of the 
best practices must in some settings be thought of, in reality, as best goals. Actual practice may still be a 
ways off. 
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Hot Issue 1: How can the ECE Region’s countries assure an ever-rising capability and participation 
of older persons in the nations’ economic and social life? 
Populations will continue to get older everywhere in the Region, increasingly rapidly in more and more 
countries. The analysis in Part 1 makes clear that increasing investments in persons’ schooling and health 
throughout the life cycle can counteract the possible negative effects of population ageing. Part 2 
indicates the most effective ways governments and citizens themselves are carrying out these investments. 
Business firms can also play an important role in retaining the elderly in the labour market. 
 
The Region contains excellent models for meeting this challenge, as well as cautionary cases that point to 
possible consequences of under- or mis-investment. We bring this evidence to bear here in suggested 
integrated policy frameworks to fill the gap being created as low fertility in the past interacts with on-
going increases in life expectancy. 
 
• Institute lifelong education opportunities, including employer-provided programs, for career 
extension and redirection at older ages. 
• Increase the proportion of young people with tertiary education. 
• Improve primary health care including reproductive health care where institutions, procedures 
and outcomes are below the Region’s average. 
• Improve data systems for monitoring and evaluation of primary health care delivery where data 
system quality is below the Region’s average. 
• Prioritize and facilitate individualized home care for the elderly over institutional care, including 
support for informal caregivers. 
• Improve gender equity in health care delivery, based on findings from the data monitoring 
system. 
• Resist pressures for hasty privatization of health care. 
• Increase the retirement age, limit early retirement options, and introduce tax credits for people 
who continue working after standard retirement age. 
• Provide (tax) incentives for employers to retain older workers. 
 
Hot Issue 2: How can the Region’s countries manage migration flows in the best interest of both 
countries and individual migrants? 
The analyses in Parts 1 and 2 indicate strong increasing incentives for persons to migrate across borders 
and probable resulting increases in actual migration. These analyses also point to broad-based 
consequences in both sending and receiving countries, consequences that transcend the traditional 
organizational units and geographic levels of governments.   
 
Policy actions can be of two sorts: to control the migration flows or to adapt to them. Best practices 
identified in Part 2 tend to combine both approaches, although the mix for a particular jurisdiction can be 
an elusive juncture of domestic culture, economics and politics, along with international diplomacy.   
 
• Institute language and culture classes to facilitate labor market success. 
• Reduce residency and citizenship hurdles for desired immigrants. 
• Improve employment and living conditions at home to reduce out-migration of schooled, 
ambitious and risk-taking young adults. 
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• Involve local and province authorities in migration policies and decisions in both sending and 
receiving countries. 
• Establish international community-to-community communication and coordination at either end 
of prominent migration corridors. 
• Insure by law and regulation that remittances arrive at their intended destinations. 
 
Hot Issue 3: How can the Region’s countries facilitate the introduction of policies that reflect 
multiple family forms and that support women and men to have as many children as they want? 
Household and family forms continue to evolve in the ECE region, where the future in the more 
traditional countries and cultures can almost undoubtedly be glimpsed in today’s least traditional ones. In 
the wake of these changes come a multitude of other challenges and opportunities. How policies can 
adjust, much less get ahead of the curve, is yet being tried out and evaluated. Some matters, though are 
clear. 
• Do not set a concrete numerical fertility goal and institute policies to attain it that do not reflect 
individuals’ fertility desires. 
• Seek family policies that aim to achieve the combined and mutually reinforcing objectives of 
child education, adult autonomy, and gender equity, rather than approaching these goals from 
different government ministries and policy directions. 
• In particular, coordinate child care support and facilitation of parents’ labour market re-entry in 
countries where these are disconnected. 
• Support fathers’ participation in child care. 
• Avoid very long-term parental leaves or income-tested allowances for such leave, policies that 
can keep women out of the labour market too long for normal career progression. 
• Institute childcare support for the period after parental return to work 
• Invest in formal early childcare. 
 
Hot Issue 4: How can the Region’s countries increase the well-being of the least well-off while 
supporting the growth of a vibrant middle class? 
The analyses in Parts 1 and 2 strongly suggest that equality of economic and social opportunity and 
reward is not the natural state to which societies tend. Evidence suggests, moreover, that tendencies 
toward inequality do emerge in vulnerable sub-populations, even in the most equalitarian countries. 
Meanwhile, although the evidence is only suggestive, the middle part of the income distribution, the 
middle class, may be shrinking through movement both up and down.   
 
Again, the Region contains effective models for meeting some parts of this challenge, while policies to 
meet other parts, particularly for vulnerable sub-populations, remain elusive. While macro-economic, tax, 
and transfer policies lie outside the domain of this report, policies that invest directly in human capital are 
directly relevant. 
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• Increase the proportion of young people with tertiary education. 
• Increase the amount of public expenditure on children and young people relative to the amount 
spent for elderly people. 
• Of all alternative investments in children and youth, emphasize early childhood education and 
care programs as producing the most effective benefits to society, both for the children and later 
when they are adults. 
• Resist the apparent tendency of education expenditures on children to fall as a society’s children 
become more ethnically different from the older population that is paying much of the supporting 
taxes. 
• Reduce the public debt burden per child. 
• Broaden health insurance coverage in countries where such coverage is below the ECE Region 
average. 
• Place remedial programmatic and fiscal emphasis on aspects of life that affect principally women, 
namely legal, geographical and financial access to sexual, reproductive and maternal health care, 
in countries where such access is below the ECE Region average. 
• Improve access to family planning in countries and regions of countries where such access is 
below the ECE Region average. 
• Bring equal protection and anti-discrimination clauses, equal retirement ages, sexual harassment 
laws, minimum legal ages of marriage, and stand-alone gender inequality laws into compliance 
with the standards of industrialized countries. 
• Implement laws and regulations already on the books regarding gender equity. 
• Supply general information and education about women’s existing rights to services and against 
domestic abuse, where knowledge in the population about such matters is below the ECE Region 
average. 
• Involve young men, partners, and husbands, along with the police and military and community 
influentials in education about gender violence, in countries where the incidence is relatively 
high. 
• Bring income tax compliance into line with tax laws, so that people pay their fair share and 
government revenue is increased. 
• In the face of macroeconomic turbulence, retain the most effective programs to underserved 
populations, including formal education, in order to stabilize the household income distribution. 
The policy areas considered here, varied as they are, form only part of the broader policy contexts that all 
governments must deal in. In no government is family policy, retirement policy, immigration policy or 
any other made in a vacuum. Hence, as foreshadowed at the beginning, we close this report by bringing 
the analysis of demographically related policies into realistic context through presentation of three very 
different policy scenarios at the global level. The population projections implied by these scenarios chart 
three different paths for demographic and education outcomes in the countries of the ECE Region. 
Though the choices are constrained severely in places, choices they still are. 
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Stark policy choices 
 
Slicing and dicing policy into discrete research areas, constituencies, ministry jurisdictions or 
parliamentary committees, even into country units, can run afoul of how policy is actually formulated and 
conducted. This is particularly true in the long view, over the decades in which governments must 
reconcile each policy with the others, and all with what other governments are doing. 
Accordingly, we now embed the best-practice policies to handle each of the four Hot Issues into one 
overarching scenario. Called the “Sustainability scenario,” this is a medley of progressive policies that 
can move the ECE countries successfully through the Hot Issues into a sustainable future. For emphasis, 
we compare the projections implied by this optimistic scenario with the projections from the competing 
“Continuation scenario“ described in Part 1, assuming that relevant policies proceed on their current 
paths. Even more telling is the comparison with a pessimistic “Fragmentation scenario” in which 
countries’ policies turn back from their current paths.23  Because the scenarios specify the directions of 
policy change (or lack of change) instead of describing the current status of policies, they are relevant for 
all countries in the ECE Region, regardless of where their histories and policies have placed them now.24 
Following the scenario descriptions are population pyramids that starkly illustrate the differences. 
In the Sustainability scenario, the world and the ECE Region within it are making relatively good 
progress with sustained efforts to achieve development goals. Elements that contribute to this are a 
reduction of inequality both globally and within economies, rapid technology development, and a high 
level of awareness regarding environmental degradation. Rapid economic growth with high employment 
levels reduces the number of people below the poverty line.  
The policy emphasis shifts to strengthening education and health investments that raise schooling levels, 
increase labour market productivity, lower mortality, and extend healthy years of life.  In the countries of 
the ECE Region, this emphasis on quality of life leads to policies that make it easier for women to 
combine work and family; hence, further fertility declines are unlikely. Migration is at intermediate 
levels. Although increasing integration of labour markets allows people to move around more freely, 
rapidly converging income levels reduce migration incentives. 
In the Continuation scenario, trends of recent decades persist, with some continuing progress towards 
achieving development goals, reducing resource and energy intensity, and slowly decreasing fossil fuel 
dependency. Technology development proceeds in industrialized countries, but is not shared with low-
income countries. Population growth is slow or negative in countries where these trends have already 
emerged. Per-capita income levels grow at a medium pace. Intra-regional income distributions improve 
slightly with increasing national income. Achievement of the ICPD goals is delayed by several decades. 
There is evidence of degradation of the environment. 
This middle-of-the-road scenario combines assumptions of medium fertility with medium mortality and 
medium migration for all countries.  It corresponds to the medium variant of the new WIC population 
                                                           
23
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is currently finalizing its Fifth Assessment Report. In this context the 
global modeling community on Integrated Assessment and Vulnerability, Risk and Adaptation has agreed to refer to a common 
set of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) that describe alternative future worlds with respect to social and economic 
mitigation and adaptation challenges. WIC/IIASA staff have contributed substantially to this formulation. The three scenarios 
described in this Report are selected from those developed for the IPCC. 
24
 Fuller descriptions of the three scenarios can be found in Appendix 1 
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projections displayed in Part 1. To the extent that the future follows trends of the recent past, this picture 
of policy and the outcomes that accompany it can be considered the most likely forecast. However, the 
future can be different, for better (the Sustainability scenario) or worse (the Fragmentation scenario). 
 
In the Fragmentation scenario, the emphasis on security at the expense of international development is 
separating the world into regional blocks of countries with little coordination between them. Population 
growth is low in industrialized countries and high in developing countries. Investments in research and 
development and in human capital are low. Accordingly, there is little if any progress in reducing 
mortality or increasing education levels. Fertility remains very low in the ECE countries and high in less 
developed countries. Due to the emphasis on security and barriers to international exchange, international 
migration is low for all countries. Disadvantaged populations continue to move to unplanned settlements 
around large urban areas, often in places that are particularly vulnerable to weather and climate events. 
Overall, these fragmented regions are characterized by extreme poverty, pockets of wealth particularly in 
the ECE region, and a bulk of countries that struggle to maintain living standards for a strongly growing 
population. This is a world failing to achieve global development goals, and with little progress in 
reducing resource intensity and fossil fuel dependency. 
 
Figures 3.1 and Appendix 4 show by means of population pyramids the projected implications of these 
three scenarios on the age structure for the year 2050.25 The ECE region as a whole is in Figure 3.1, 
showing 2010 and the three alternative 2050 pyramids for comparison. In addition to age and sex by five-
year age groups, the pyramids also display the numbers of persons with no education and primary, 
secondary and tertiary education, actual for 2010 and projected for 2050. (Education for children younger 
than 15 is not shown because their education may not yet be completed.) 
 
The pyramids in Figure 3.1 demonstrate the enormous differences in population numbers and population 
quality that alternative policy regimes can make over the next three decades. Population growth between 
2010 and 2050 is identical at about 14 per cent under Continuation and Sustainability, but falls to only 3 
per cent in the Fragmentation scenario, due largely to the failure of life expectancy to continue its rapid 
expansion and a decrease in migration intensity. Alongside, the standard old-age dependency ratio rises in 
all three scenarios, but by considerably more under Sustainability and considerably less under 
Fragmentation (for the exact figures see Appendix 4). To counterbalance this, the Sustainability world 
invests more in education and health, showing a 1.5 year gain in mean years of schooling of persons 25+, 
compared to only 0.8 years under Fragmentation, so a health-adjusted measure might well come out 
ahead. For women 20-39 years old, the difference is even more extreme: years of schooling gains of 1.5 
years, 1.0 years, and a projected decline of 0.3 years under Sustainability, Continuation and 
Fragmentation, respectively. For the wellbeing of the next generation, this may be the most important 
difference of all because higher education is related to better health outcomes, better reproductive health, 
and higher and longer employment, to mention just a few of the effects relevant to this report.  
  
                                                           
25
 More detailed pyramids for each sub-region and the ECE region as a whole for 2010, 2030 and 2050, along with the 
accompanying data discussed in this section, are displayed in Appendix 4. 
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Figure 3.1 Population Pyramids for the ECE Region for Three Policy Scenarios. 2010, 2050 
 
 
Note: Population pyramids for the ECE sub-regions are available in appendix 4. 
Source: Lutz et al (2013). 
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The sets of pyramids for each sub-region, as displayed in Appendix 4, show even more dramatic 
differences across the scenarios. Looking at South Eastern Europe, for example, note the large differences 
in population size and school attainment between business as usual in the Continuation scenario and best 
practice adoption in the Sustainability scenario. The differences are even more striking when compared to 
the Fragmentation scenario. This sub-region can, according to these projections, dramatically increase its 
schooling levels to compensate for a higher dependency ratio under the Sustainability scenario.  
 
In general the future demographic prospects under different scenarios differ markedly across the ECE 
sub-regions. In South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Caucasus, and Central Asia, population growth 
and structure by education show the most extreme differences. There the Sustainability scenario produces 
slower population growth or even population decrease and faster population ageing than the 
Fragmentation scenario. At the same time, human capital improvement is close to zero under the 
Fragmentation scenario and expanding under Sustainability. 
  
These two effects are interconnected and act together in molding the future demographic structure. If the 
population attains higher education, we may expect a convergence of fertility levels towards levels close 
to replacement and increased life expectancy, the two factors that underpin population ageing. At the 
same time, we can expect that such a population will be more healthy and productive, able to secure itself 
economically for a longer time, and less of a burden for society. Numerical population growth under the 
Fragmentation scenario results from the diverging fertility differential between higher and lower educated 
sub-populations. Population growth in this scenario is accompanied by stagnation of human capital, and 
consequently by growing social cleavages. Therefore the numerical advantage of higher population 
growth is not turned into a human capital and economic advantage. This development may mean the same 
or most likely even a larger burden to social systems and social cohesion.  
 
These scenario projection comparisons demonstrate that countries’ future population development goals 
should not include numerical population growth but instead emphasize growth of human capital.: 
Through focusing on quality education, health care, and increased economic activity of the population, 
including female and older populations, policymakers should be making better use of the human potential 
that already exists in their countries. Population ageing is a demographic issue, but it does not call for 
narrow demographic solutions. 
 
In the New EU States and West ECE countries the differences in population growth are smaller across the 
scenarios. In the case of Western Europe and North America, the scenario pattern even reverses, with 
lower population growth under the Fragmentation scenario. This is because of diminished migration due 
to policy restrictions on migration, as well as the worsening mortality conditions of some population 
segments.26  
                                                           
26
 For detailed analyses of these and other projection differences across the scenarios, see Lutz, Butz and KC, forthcoming 2013. 
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The best policy 
 
Embedded in this Sustainability scenario are most of the best practices identified in this Report. Could 
governments pick and choose among them, attaining very particular targets while continuing or even 
weakening other parts of their social support and human capital investment portfolio? From history, the 
answer is yes … for a while. But the social fabric is strong in all the ECE countries, woven as it is out of 
history and culture. Policy research is replete with examples of narrow policy interventions that after 
awhile ran up against these constraints and ceased to function effectively.  
 
Within these constraints of history and culture and the more immediate challenge of recession-generated 
limitations, a better choice than investment in the quality of people--their schooling and health—will be 
hard to find. The economic returns are substantial, extending into the retirement years and forward into 
the next generation. The returns beyond economics are also substantial. Fortunately, there is no mystery 
how to make these investments and no starting point in 2013 too modest or two advanced that measurable 
progress cannot be made. 
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